Belgium. The official account of what happened 1939-1940.

BELGIUM

The Official Account of
what happened
1939-1940

Published for

THE BELGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
by

EVANS BROTHERS LIMITED, LONDON

THE LIBRARY
THE UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS

CONTENTS

1 NTKODUCTION 1X

I Tnu International Situation of Belgium Before

i i if. Conflict 1

It Bi i (in i m ani> the European Conflict ... 7

III Iiiii German Aggression 26

IV i |o\y mi Bi i c»iAN Army Defended the Territory 32

Appendices

I .|,,m|i I.Y Mh Kill)' lo llu* Council of Ministers on
nt iHl" i Mih, I'JW. . ...

i |li Hh.lt I >•’< Inin I Ion of April 24th, 1937 .

l m m It in Dm < IhuiiIm r ul h‘ fpicscntfitivcsby M. Spaak,
ix l, n i in | hi I Oiupii Alla i is, on April 29th, 1937 .

•I < inm.ni I )r» lit i nl ion of October 13th, 1937

, | >. . hunt ion made by King Leopold on behalf of the
I lends of the States of the Oslo Group, August 23rd,

1939

Declaration made by the Ambassador of Germany on
August 26th, 1939 ....

/. I )eclarations made by the Ambassadors of Great Britain
and France on August 27th and 28th, 1939 .

K. Declaration of Neutrality, September 3rd, 1939 ,

»> The King’s Order of the Day to the Army, September
4th, 1939

10. Speech by the King, Broadcast to the United States on

October 27th, 1939 ....

1 1 . Telegram from Queen Wilhelmina and King Leopold

to the Heads of the States of Germany, France, and
Great Britain, dated November 7th, 1939
v

53

56

57

67

68

69

70
72

77

77

79

Vi CONTENTS

Appendices (< continued )

12. Speech in the Chamber of Representatives by M.
Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on December

19th, 1939 SO

13. Secret Instruction to the Commander of the Second

Luftflotte found in a German Aeroplane on January
10th, 1940 . .85

14. Speech in the Senate by M. Spaak, Minister for Foreign

Affairs, on April 16th, 1940 91

1 5. Note by the Ministry of National Defence, dated March

28th, 1940, on the Defensive Works carried out since
the Beginning of the Conflict .... 96

16. Measures taken by Belgium to strengthen the National

Defence System 97

17. Text of the Protest drawn up by the Belgian

Government against the German Aggression of
May 10th, 1940 ...... 100

18. Proclamation by King Leopold, May 10th, 1940 . 102

19. German Leaflets dropped in the Belgian Lines . . 102

20. King Leopold’s Order of the Day, May 25th, 1940 . 104

z,l. Statement by Lieut. -Colonel Robert Duncan Brown,
United States Military Attachd to Belgium and
Luxemburg

22. The Belgian Campaign: Sir Roger Keyes v. Daily

Mirror. (High Court of Justice, June 13th, 1941) . 106

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE

( <>i*y on a Declaration made by the French Ambassa-
dor August 28th, 1939 71

FACING PAGES

1 mi y on Secret Instructions of the German Command 88, 89

PAGE

1 1 »i*y c >1 ( iEUMAN Leaflets dropped in the Belgian Lines 103

1 in King's Order of the Day to the Army, May 25th,

|‘M() 105

I IN I Ol MAPS

M r I lm PniHlnN ON May 10 Til, 1940 ... 32

Mm- ■ 1 m German Descent on the Line Eben-

I .11 Him I, May 10th, 1940 ... 34

Mm* 1 I he Position on May 13th, 1940 ... 38

Mai* 4: Tub Threat to Abbeville, May 20th, 1940 . 42

Map 5: The Last Stand, May 26th-27th, 1940

vii

48

INTRODUCTION

This is no time to embark on a complete history of
the war in Belgium — too many essential facts are
still missing.

The German offensive of May 1940 was so
dramatic and had such devastating results that it made
a very deep impression on public opinion. People
were badly shaken by such unexpected events ; they
were bewildered, and found it difficult to understand
what had happened. Under the emotional strain of
those critical hours, feeling was so intense that the
facts were distorted and twisted. The popular
imagination seized on the kind of explanation that
always flourishes in time of trouble : the disaster was
said to be due to treason or, to use the current
expression, to the work of a Fifth Column which was
said to be assuming alarming proportions. Amongst
thinking people some deemed it wiser to suspend
judgment.

A year has now elapsed. Many new facts have
gradually come to light and their accuracy has been
tested. We are also a little farther away and are
able to judge them in their true perspective.

In these circumstances, we have thought fit to
bring together such of the principal documents as we
have been able to obtain. They are arranged in
chronological order, and are preceded by a com-
mentary putting them in their proper setting and
showing the connexion between them. The com-
ments also describe the mission assigned to Belgium,

X INTRODUCTION

in agreement with the neighbouring Powers, in
the arrangements for guaranteeing the security of
Western Europe, and what she did to fulfil it. With
the help of these documents, the reader should be
able to form his own judgment.

The series comes to an end with the surrender
which brought the campaign of the Belgian Army to a
close on May 28th. A second work on similar lines
will deal with the steps taken by Belgium — with the
co-operation of the British Government and the
other Governments engaged in the common fight —
to free her national territory.

July, 1941.

the library

THE U! ‘ • VERSITY
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I

I HE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION OF BELGIUM
BEFORE THE CONFLICT

Wiii:n Belgium’s independence was guaranteed under the
treaties of 1839, a regime of perpetual neutrality was
imposed on her. In 1918, the British and French Govern-
ment recognized that the changed situation in Europe made
lli* hv. (oration of this regime out of the question. For four
v< .ii . ih« Belgian Army fought, side by side with the British
mi. I I i. *m li Armies to free Belgium’s national territory.
\h. . it.. Armr.lkr, she shared the occupation of the left

i. i.il <i| ill.- Bliliir with (hem In 1920, the Belgian and
l n in I. * !• in i >il M.i 1 1 (••in hod mi agreement fixing the

. Iinlctd (I '..i lei print ion between Belgium

.mi. I I ...... in Hi. . .hi n| m IVosli unprovoked aggression

h i ai hi. mv M 1 1 i.i i inn. ( ierinany was far from having

I 1 1 • i ii hi. mi. iiIm lo the limits laid down in the

I nni v n! Vn sallies. Al the same time Belgium was
Minloir. lo conclude with Great Britain an arrangement
pm\ i.llng for her security. But she was unable to overcome

ii. . objections raised by the British Government. A pro-
p. trial was, however, made in 1922. It provided that should
« lernmny make a direct unprovoked attack on Belgium,
< oral Britain would immediately come to her assistance
with all her naval, military, and air forces, on the understand-
ing that in such a contingency Belgium would defend her
own frontiers with all her military, naval, and air forces.
I bis proposal was turned down by the British Government
because the condition laid down by Great Britain — a similar
agreement with France — could not be fulfilled.

Belgium hoped to obtain new guarantees through the
League of Nations. She played an active part in drawing
up the Covenant. She was a Member of the Council
l

2 BELGIUM BEFORE THE CONFLICT

without a break until 1926. In 1920, her Minister for
Foreign Affairs was President of the Assembly. On many
occasions, particularly over the Corfu incident, she did not
hesitate to insist on the application of the Covenant to
Great Powers with whom she was on friendly terms. In
1936, despite her ties with Italy, her first Delegate declared
that Belgium would carry out all her obligations with regard
to the application of sanctions. She assisted actively in the
League’s attempts to secure the limitation and gradual
reduction of armaments, and several of her delegates played
an important part in this field.

In 1925, Belgium, together with Great Britain, France,
Germany, and Italy, signed the Locarno Agreements. She
assumed a role in the organization of Western Europe which
was subsequently to prove out of all proportion to the force
at the disposal of a small State. That is to say, she under-
took to assist Germany in the event of a French aggression
or France in the event of a German aggression. But the
risk seemed quite theoretical at that time. Europe appeared
to be entering upon a period of pacification, concord, and
international co-operation.

Before long, however, matters took a very different turn
and disillusiomnent set in. The economic depression of
1930 had a shattering effect on Europe. Unemployment
and poverty increased the feeling of discontent that was
already beginning to find expression among the unsatisfied
nations, and their nationalism became increasingly revolu-
tionary and aggressive in character. The coming into
power of the Hitler regime precipitated matters. It is only
necessary, by way of a reminder, to mention a few of the
more outstanding events.

After Hitler became Chancellor of the Reich on January
30th, 1933, Germany withdrew ostentatiously from the
League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference. This
happened on October 14th. On June 14th, 1934, Hitler and
Mussolini had their first meeting at Venice ; on March 16th,
1935, Germany repudiated the military, naval, and air
clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, and announced that

BELGIUM BEFORE THE CONFLICT 3

m i isc i i pi ion would be introduced. This followed upon the
nmouncement, a few days earlier, of the formation of a
i mlilary air force; on October 2nd of the same year, Italy
Invaded Ethiopia in flagrant violation of the provisions of
l In* Covenant of the League of Nations. On March 7th,
B> U>, ( Jcrman troops reoccupied the left bank of the Rhine
i ml Ihe Treaty of Locarno was repudiated; on July 4th, the
I ragin' of Nations admitted that sanctions had failed and
dr i » > 1 1 1 i n ucd them. On July 17th, civil war broke out in
Spain.

lie i events, which followed upon one another with
in* i. u .mg rapidity and were of increasing gravity, were a

hr to Belgium of new threats to the peace of Europe

mid miiM'qtienlly to her own security. By reducing her
own iimininriils. Great Britain had allowed Germany to
i* ii i m. mh mi hr i which she was unable to overtake;

I sMr. * 1 1 * ii< d by a long financial, industrial, and

• "id »iM; ll» liii* i national nrdci created after the
w ni Id \\ H i nn lung! i mit it re

I** I'Mti li I* nun hml hi to ill measures to strengthen the

• I* h m «•*, i*l il unit ', I’ai hameivl passed a plan for

0 ImiIiiji oi m I it n m b i in.* in)* the Belgian fortifications. In
i- mi' ill 1 1 ili* | •• i.itioiis of I i 6 gc and Namur were reinforced.

1 i* ■ fin* o| fl. fence were established along the canal from
Mm im fit In Bois-le-Duc, the canal joining the Meuse and
I « mil and the Albert Canal.

I In protection of the eastern frontier, based mainly on
ili* i lest ruction of a number of roads, was entrusted to new
ini motions (frontier cyclist units, “ Chasseurs Ardennais ”).

In the spring of 1935, these measures were almost com-
plet'\, but even then they were no longer adequate. A
i on Bagration might break out suddenly. There was not
nl lie icnt protection against such a risk. In order that the
i li ly of the country might at all times be ensured, the period
of military service had to be prolonged, and provision was
i ii; i do for this in a new Bill, but it was opposed by a large
ici lion of the public. This was due, to a considerable

• nn nt, to suspicion of Belgium’s international engagements :

4 BELGIUM BEFORE THE CONFLICT

it was feared that they v/ould involve her in conflicts far from
home. The Coalition Government, consisting of Catholics,
Socialists, and Liberals, then in power, had so far been
unable to break down this prejudice. It was then that
the King, conscious of his constitutional duties, made a
new attempt to convince his Ministers of the need for
improving the defences of the country, while at the same time
allaying the anxiety of those who feared the risks involved by
Belgium’s international obligations. That is the significance
of the statement he made at the meeting of the Council con-
vened at the Palace on October 14th, 1936 (Appendix 1).
His speech made a great impression on the members of the
Government; it was thought likely to remove the objections
of the opponents of the Bill, and the King was asked whether
it might be made public. The precise significance of the
speech was not understood abroad ; it was taken as a new
departure in Belgian policy. The only passage to attract
attention was that relating to the international situation of
Belgium. At first sight, it was not realized that, from the
Government’s point of view, the object of the speech and the
reason why it was published was to gain the support of the
Belgian public for the proposal to strengthen the national
defences.

The British and French Governments, who had been better
informed, had no doubt as to the position. They recognized
that in the existing state of affairs in Europe Belgium’s
attitude was justified. They readily admitted that any
aggression of which she was the victim would constitute a
direct threat to the neighbouring Powers ; that by protecting
access to her territory, Belgium was making the most
effective contribution towards the security of the surrounding
States ; that in this way she was doing her utmost to fulfil her
function in this part of Europe which was so often exposed to
the ravages of war.

It was in these circumstances that the Franco-British
Declaration of April 24th, 1937, was made (Appendix 2).

The British and French Govermnents took note of
Belgium’s determination, expressed publicly and on more

BELGIUM BEFORE THE CONFLICT 5

than one occasion, to defend her frontiers with all her
forces against any aggression or invasion, and to prevent
Belgian territory from being used, for purposes of aggression
against another State, as a passage or as a base of operations
by land, by sea, or in the air. They therefore released
Belgium from her undertakings to render assistance under
the Locarno Treaty, while maintaining their own under-
takings to render assistance to Belgium under the Treaty.

The British and French Governments also took note of
the renewed assurances of the Belgian Government “ of the
lidelity of Belgium to the Covenant of the League of Nations
and to the obligations which it involves for Members of the
I ,eague.” Belgian policy was always based on that principle,
blit experience had shown that the coercive measures pro-
vided for in Article 16 of the Covenant were inoperative.
In practice, as was clear at the time of the Sino-Japanese
dispute in 1931, they were regarded as optional. This was
explicitly recognized by most of the Members of the League
of Nations at the 1938 Assembly, and their application was
not even demanded when Germany committed acts of
aggression in 1939. It may be remarked here that the
Treaty of Locarno could not have been invoked had it
remained in force. It did not guarantee Poland, but only
the status quo on the Rhineland frontiers. Belgium was
only to assist France in the event of an unprovoked act of
aggression by Germany, and to assist Germany in the event
of an unprovoked act of aggression by France. Neither of
these two contingencies occurred. The decision of the
British and French Governments to release Belgium from her
obligation was not therefore in any way to change her
position with regard to the events which marked the opening
of the European conflict.

Nevertheless, the negotiations undertaken after the
repudiation of the Treaty of Locarno by Germany with a
view to replacing the Treaty by a new general Act continued.

I ngland had not at that time lost all hope of bringing them
to a successful conclusion. No doubt she had begun to
loarm. But in November 1936, the Prime Minister, Mr.

6 BELGIUM BEFORE THE CONFLICT

Baldwin, admitted that there had been some delay, and in j
the spring of 1937 his successor, Mr. Chamberlain, showed
his determination to combine the strengthening of defence
measures with “ a substantial effort to remove the causes
which are delaying the return of confidence in Europe.”
This attempt was to continue until 1939, and it was only
abandoned a very few months before the beginning of the war.

That, at any rate, was the atmosphere in Europe in 1937.
In January, Chancellor Hitler declared that he was prepared
at any moment to recognize the inviolability of Belgian
territory. Following up this intention he made a declaration
to the Belgian Government on October 13th, the most impor-
tant passages of which repeat the words of the Franco-British
Declaration of April 24th (Appendix 4).

The two declarations sanctioned what the Belgian Govern-
ment has described as a “ policy of independence.” It used
this expression in order to draw a distinction between that
policy and the neutrality of Belgium, as laid down con-
tractually before the German aggression in 1914 ; it intended
at the same time to indicate that it reserved full liberty to act
at any time in the interests of the country. If, bearing in
mind the unstable situation in Europe, it restricted Belgium’s
international undertakings, that was first from motives of
honesty : it did not want to undertake obligations which were
regarded as excessive by a large section of the public and
which it was not sure of being able to fulfil. Secondly, it
was with the intention of concentrating the national forces.
If they were all to be mobilized, it was necessary that the
country should concentrate on one urgent and indisputable
duty, and one only— national defence. It was essential that
immediately an act of aggression was committed, the whole
nation, fully aware that it was blameless, should rise up as
one man, just as it did in August 1914 (Appendix 3). 1

1 Mr. Winston Churchill defended a similar policy in Parliament on
November 23rd, 1932, when he said : “ Their duty is not only to try, within
the restricted limits which, I fear, are all that is open to them, to prevent war,
but to make sure that we ourselves are not involved in one, and, above all, to
make sure that, if war should break out among other Powers, our country
and the King’s Dominions can be effectively defended, and will be able to
preserve, if they desire to do so, that strong and unassailable neutrality from

II

BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT

In the spring of 1939, when Germany suddenly invaded
Czechoslovak territory, no shadow of doubt remained:
Europe was moving rapidly towards a general conflict.
This was a distressing prospect for all peace-loving nations.
Belgium, though she felt powerless before the coming storm,
continued to the end to do everything in her power to ward
it off.

She had not forgotten the Great War and four years
of enemy occupation. She realized that the totalitarian
countries, with their worship of force, would display
unparalleled brutality in a new war. She was also aware
that they had forged a formidable weapon to ensure su-
periority on land and in the air, and above all, that their
Air Force was far bigger than the Air Forces of the great
Democracies.

Belgium reflected upon the ordeal which faced Europe and
a great part of mankind ; she also reflected upon the risks to
which she was herself exposed. Her policy had undoubtedly
been a prudent one, and at the same time she had made a
great mili tary effort. But experience had taught her that, in
spite of declarations and solemn undertakings, she would be
in grave danger, in the event of a European conflict, of being
used once again as the battlefield of the Great Powers.

Her anxiety was shared by the small States on the North
Sea and the Baltic, which had for several years been in the

which we must never be drawn except by the heart and conscience of the

“in 0 ”' speech in Parliament on March 8th, 1934, he reverted to the same
idea : “ . . . But, putting the preservation of peace in the first place, what is the
next great object that we must have in view ? It is to secure our rotional
freedom of choice to remain outside a European war, if one should break out.
That I put as the more direct and more practical issue, subordinate to, but
not less important than, the preservation of peace.”

2 7

BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT

habit under the name of the Oslo Group, of exchanging
views from time to time about questions of mutual interest
connected with the League of Nations. These consultations

fideLe Tnd h a H SP f rlt ° f ^ COrdiality and mutua * con-
hdence, and had, of course, nothing to do with political or

mditary obligations. Thus, in July 1938, when the inter-

P°" a Sltuatl °n already looked black on account of events

^ n a ’ thC F ° reign Ministers of the Oslo States

met at Copenhagen, and after their exchange of views
declared themselves “prepared, for their part, to collab-
orate in any international attempt at conciliation in a spirit
iSl; M'Pondence tow,„h th, various

In August 1939, war seemed to be imminent The
Governments of these small States accepted a suggestion
put forward by Belgium and agreed to make a last effort to
save Peace When negotiations between the Great Powers
seemed to be broken off for good and all, an appeal on
humanitarian grounds might possibly enable them to set

SLTm- ,° f PreStige and re °P en conversations. Thl
Au 'uft nT l wer f convened urgently to Brussels on
, 23rd ’ , where the y adopted a declaration. King

reiTim ’ n pe f kln ? ° n behalf of the heads of the Oslo States,
the^ik laration to the whole world on the same day at

InneaMn Falace . (Appmdix 5). It was a heartrending
appeal to public opinion to pull itself together and not to

althmioh u the lde f th ,f a catastr °phe was inevitable. But
sb tb ® a PP eal called for a pacific settlement, there was
no ambiguity, no question of resignation in the face of
wolence and accomplished facts. “ Let there be no mistake!”
e King. The peace that we want is peace with
respect for the rights of all nations. A durable peace cannot

b Tit Se p ° n f0r ? ' Tt Ca “ 0nly be based on a moral order.”
Po P e a, id many Governments associated themselves
with the appeal. The British and French Governments fully
sympathized, and pointed out that they had always urged the

GefmTnv u? “ eth0ds of a11 international difputes.
Germany and Italy made no comment.

BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT 9

A few days later, on August 26th, the German Ambassador
at his own request was received by the King in the presence
of the Prime Minister. He declared of his own accord that
the Government of the Reich was firmly determined to com-
ply with the terms of the German Declaration of October
1 3th, 1937, according to which the Reich would in no circum-
stances impair the inviolability and integrity of Belgium, but
would at all times respect Belgian territory (Appendix 6).

On the following days, the Ambassadors of Great Britain
and France also gave an assurance, on behalf of their
Governments, that should the efforts of these Governments
to maintain peace fail, and should Belgium, in such a con-
tingency, adopt an attitude of neutrality, they were resolved,
in accordance with their traditional policy, fully to respect
Belgium’s neutrality (Appendix 7).

On August 28th, the situation became even more critical.
Queen Wilhelmina and King Leopold, being anxious to the
last to leave nothing undone, however slight, to avert the
danger, made an offer of their good offices to Great Britain,
France, Poland, Germany, and Italy. The representatives of
these countries were called upon one by one by M. Pierlot
in Brussels and simultaneously by M. van Kleffens at The
Hague. 1

But nothing could be done to stem the tide of events.

On September 1st, the German Army entered Poland.
Germany refused to withdraw her troops, and Great Britain
and France therefore considered themselves to be in a state of
war with her on September 3rd.

The dreaded disaster had occurred.

From that time Belgium’s duty was plain. It had been
clearly laid down in 1936 ; it was not discussed and there was
no ambiguity about it. Great Britain and France on the
one hand and Germany on the other had taken note of it
in 1937, solemnly indicating their approval. Furthermore,
they had confirmed it several days earlier in their statements

1 The offer was renewed on November 7th in circumstances which will be
described later on.

10 BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT

Of August 26th, 27th, 28th, 1939. “ Once again I arrived at
the reassuring conviction,” said the Foreign Minister in

the. Chamber on A P nI 16th > 1940, “ that our foreign policy

' P erfectl y c °rrect. Few countries can have
defined their objectives so clearly; confined themselves to
promises they could be sure of keeping; enlightened their
neighbours as to their intentions. There was not-there is not
—any change, any element of surprise. Whatever happens
nobody can say Belgium deceived them ” (Appendix 14)
Now that the Great Powers of the West were at war with

adopted° ther ' Be ‘ 8IUm had t0 foUow the P olic y she had
Politically, she was in much the same position as in 1914

55^** f, s in l 9 ! 4 ’ was her highest interest
aithfully and loyally to fulfil her international obligations,
le was under no obligation to take part in the war. The
Rhine Pact did not apply, and in any case it did not bind her
The League of Nations was not asked to take action, and if
it had been, its recommendations would have been optional.

On the other hand, the position taken note of in the
Declarations of Great Britain, France, and Germany in
' 937 ™P’/ Cd ih at m such a conflict Belgium would be neutral.

e had therefore to fulfil the obligations imposed on neutral
Mates under international law. On September 3rd, the

^ppendk P 8) b lShCd Belgian Declaration of Neutrality

In the economic sphere, difficult questions immediately
arose, because the belligerents took opposing views. The
Belgian Government based all its negotiations with them on
two principles. First, it endeavoured to safeguard Belgian
interests autonomously by prohibiting or regulating the
export of such foodstuffs and essential raw materials as were
not produced in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of the
country. The second principle was based on Article 9 of
the Hague Convention, which prohibited neutral States from
imposing any prohibition or restriction on a belligerent State
which it did not similarly impose on other belligerent States.
These two principles were hardly open to question. They

BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT 11

did, of course, involve a heavy reduction in Belgian exports
to Germany; but there was no legal ground for Germany’s
protests. Great Britain and France recognized that they
provided all the guarantees they could reasonably expect.

Belgium’s duty was most obvious in the military sphere.

1 1 ere, it is sufficient to refer to the terms of the Declarations
or 1937, when Germany, as well as Great Britain and France,
took note of the Belgian Government’s determination (a) to
defend the frontiers of Belgium with all its forces against any
aggression or invasion, and to prevent Belgian territory
from being used, for purposes of aggression against any
other State, as a passage or as a base of operations by land,
by sea, or in the air ; ( b ) to organize the defence of Belgium
i n an efficient manner for this purpose.

Since 1912 Belgium had had a system of compulsory
general service. In peace-time she had six infantry divisions
and two cavalry divisions, forming three army corps and one
cavalry corps. From 1934 there were also frontier guard
units and the “ Chasseurs Ardennais.” In war-time Belgium
could, by means of general mobilization, raise an army of
twenty infantry divisions, one cavalry corps and troops for
the fortifications— about 650,000 men in all.

In 1930, as we have already seen, she restored and improved
her fortifications; in 1935 she tried to provide greater
protection by extending the period of service, and this was
increased to seventeen months under a law passed at the
beginning of 1937; at the same time, she maintained her
annual contingent in spite of the years when the birth-rate
was low ; she improved and added to her material, mechanized
the whole of the cavalry, and extended and developed the
training of units on active service and in the reserve.

When the crisis occurred in September 1938, she called up
several classes and put twelve infantry divisions on a war-
time footing. Partial mobilization was costly, but it was a
useful experiment and enabled improvements .to be made.
A more flexible system was introduced by which mobiliza-
tion was divided into five successive stages, A to E.

As a frontier country at the outposts of Germany and

12 BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT

France Belgium had to be on her guard, during an inter-
national crisis, immediately the neighbouring Powers took
military measures, so as to avoid being taken by surprise.
As in the past, tms rule was scrupulously observed

a j s fr .°. m 24th and 25th, Army leave was cancelled

and soldiers on leave were recalled. On the 25th was
decided Stage A of mobilization. This was the first of the
provisions for putting our military machine on a war-time
footing. On the 26th a Royal Decree declared that the
country was in a state of mobilization. Its object was to

the entry int ° force of several Ie §islative and
administrative measures provided for in the event of an
international crisis. The Decree was therefore not an order
or general mobilization. On the contrary, it explained
that mobilization of the Army would be spread over
several stages on the orders of the Minister of National
efence. On August 28th, mobilization passed to Stage
B, this involved the supervision and guarding of the fron-

of^rfifipH 1 pr ? lectl0n and °f >servati on. The garrisons

all nnWp P ?r S were reinforced - At the same time,
all pnvate and foreign aircraft were prohibited from flying

over Belgian territory and territorial waters, with the excep-
tion of aircraft of regular fines and aircraft holding an
authorization from the Ministry of Communications

n 2> * f ° pening hostilities in Poland, the Minister of
National Defence ordered Stage C of mobilization, which
involved the calling up of units of the first reserve. This was
completed by September 3rd.

On September 4th, the King issued an Order of the Day
under Article 68 of the Constitution, announcing that he had
taken command of the Army (Appendix 9). On the 10th

of n trdn^° f reSerVe UnitS Were recalled for a Period

Po^n r rl ng f^ ePtem , ber ’ r he German offensi ve was aimed at
oland, the western front remained calm. France did

not have sufficient effectives, or material, or aeroplanes to
engage successfully in offensive operations. By the middle

BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT 13

of' September, mobilization was proceeding systematically,
and about fifty divisions had been called up. England had
sent three divisions to the Continent.

At that time, Poland had already virtually succumbed to
(he attacks of armoured divisions and a formidable air
force. The campaign in the east was at an end, and in a
speech in the Reichstag on October 6th, Chancellor Hitler
described the results achieved. In the favourable circum-
stances produced by his military successes, he seemed
disposed to enter into peace negotiations. However, the
German armies were brought back from the eastern front
and the whole of the forces were placed on the western
frontier. Over fifty divisions were concentrated on the left
bank of the Rhine on the frontiers of southern Holland and
Belgium. From that moment hardly a week passed without
the Belgian military authorities receiving information of
steady reinforcements of both men and materials in this area :
new divisions, the number facing the Dutch and Belgian
frontiers increasing to nearly seventy; large quantities of
material for bridge-building for crossing watercourses,
munition dumps, aerodromes, etc. The Belgian Army
Command was therefore compelled progressively to increase
its precautionary measures, and to carry on with the mobili-
zation of the Army, so that it was soon almost up to a war-
time footing.

On several occasions the Belgian military authorities
received information which led them to fear an immediate
act of aggression. The effect of these warnings was to
speed up the mobilization of the Belgian forces and to
stimulate arrangements for putting the country in a complete
state of defence.

The first “ alert ” occurred at the end of October.
Holland appeared specially threatened. According to
information reaching the Netherlands authorities, a surprise
German attack was to be launched at dawn on Sunday,
November 12th. Alarming signs were brought simul-
taneously to the notice of the Belgian Government.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands has

4 <?&£>

14 BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT

described how he decided, in the circumstances, to suggest
to Queen Wilhelmina that she should renew the offer of
good offices previously made on August 28th in conjunction
with King Leopold. 1 This suggestion was made in Brussels
on Monday, November 6th. So that no time should be lost,
the King left for The Hague the same evening, accompanied
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his Military Adviser.
The draft was completed on the following morning and was
sent in the afternoon to the King of England, the President
of the French Republic, and the Chancellor of the German
Reich (Appendix 11). Alarming news about Germany’s
military intentions continued to arrive during the next few
days, and it appeared to confirm that an attack was imminent.
Then, all of a sudden, the plans for aggression seemed to
have been abandoned. Was this really the case, or was it
only a blind ? Even now it is impossible to be sure. How-
ever, the information as a whole was sufficient to justify
most elaborate precautions.

During the first fortnight of January, there was another
grave warning, and all forms of national defence were
pushed forward as quickly as possible.

A German courier plane made a forced landing at
Mechelen-sur-Meuse in Belgian territory on January 10th
The two officers on board said that they had lost their way
in the fog above the Ruhr basin and the valley of the Rhine.
One of the two officers had some confidential papers which
he twice tried to burn. He almost succeeded the second
time: he managed to throw them suddenly into a lighted
stove while he was being questioned, but a Belgian officer
rushed forward, put his hand in the stove and pulled them
out of the flames three-parts burned. They consisted of
instructions to the squadron-leader of No. 2 Air Fleet about
the offensive which the German Western Army was to carry
out across Belgium from the Moselle to the North Sea.
The Sixth German Army was specially instructed to destroy
the Belgian Army, launching its main attack in the Maastricht
district ; the Seventh Air Force Division, conveyed by air, was

1 Van Kleffens, The Rape of the Netherlands, pp. 85-8.

BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT 15

to land between the Sambre and the Meuse (Appendix 13).

Was the document authentic ? Was it really an accident
that it had fallen into the hands of the Belgian Army ? A
thorough enquiry was made, and the hypothesis of a trick
was dismissed. It was certainly a severe winter, and snow
and frost hardly seemed propitious to military operations.
But it was clear from the papers that it would be easier for
German air-borne troops to land if the ground was hard
with frost. Other disturbing news which came to hand at
the same time seemed to confirm this. It was feared that
the German Command, learning that important parts of the
plan of operations had fallen into the hands of the Belgian
authorities, would carry it through at once, so that there
would be no time to counter the attack.

As this plan involved a threat to England, France, the
Netherlands, as well as Belgium, their military authorities
were immediately informed.

The Army remained at the ready for several days ; then,
as no important troop movements on the frontier had been
reported, it was concluded that the attack had again been
postponed.

However, important additions were made to the Belgian
defences. The Army continued to organize its positions.

The Belgian Army was disposed as a covering force on
positions along the Albert Canal from Antwerp to Liege and
along the Meuse from Liege to Namur. Advanced units
and demolition squads deployed from the German and
Netherlands frontier were to hamper the invader and prevent
contact on this protective position. This was a very strong
position, and the natural obstacles were supplemented and
reinforced by means of a large number of fortifications and
fieldworks. But there were three serious drawbacks :

(1) It was a long way from the French frontier.

(2) It was very extended (over 200 kilometres).

(3) It was semi-elliptical.

Owing to its distance from the French frontier, no Franco-
British help could be expected on that line. Yet by itself

16

BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT

the Belgian Army could not engage the German forces on
a front of over 200 kilometres without running the risk of
being annihilated. Again, being a semi-ellipse with the
point at Liege, it was dangerously exposed to flank attacks,
particularly in the north, where a local break-through would
irreparably threaten the whole position.

Quite clearly the Albert-Meuse Canal position could only
be a covering position. If the Belgian Army were to offer
resistance there, the Franco-British forces and the bulk of
the Belgian Army would have time to occupy a position
connecting the fortified towns of Antwerp and Namur. This
line, which runs through Koningshoyckt-Malines-Louvain-
Wavre, is known as the K.W. position, after the places at
?«5 5 e !l d - The construction of the line K.W. was begun in
tyjy. The experience gained during the construction of
the Liege and Namur fortifications and the lessons learnt

mn" 1 Span 3 s . h War were largely taken into account,
me K.W. position comprised a large number of works
spread over several lines. The front was protected by a con-
tinuous anti-tank barrier and by arrangements for flooding
wlnle anti-tank traps were provided well inside the position’

There was also an underground telephone system and a road
system.

The Belgian line thus embraced the fortified town of
Antwerp, the K.W. line, and the fortified town of Namur
Un this position— supported at the North Sea by the
fortified town of Antwerp and extended south and con-
nected with the Maginot Line by the Meuse cutting— the
Belgian Army-with the help of the Franco-British forces
expected on the third day of the war— had decided to engage
in the battle which was to stem the invasion.

This defence line had for long been known as one of
the most important strategic lines in Western Europe. It
was very near the line of the armies of Louis XIV when
Belgium was defended against the Coalition forces under
Marlborough.

The Belgians are well aware of the price their country has
had to pay for the doubtful privilege of being used as a

BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT 17

battlefield by its powerful neighbours. It was therefore not
without some apprehension that the Belgian Government
contemplated the stabilization of the front on the Antwerp—
Namur line. Indeed, its choice meant the certain destruc-
tion of the chief towns of Belgium — Brussels, Antwerp,
Malines, Louvain, Namur, Lierre, Gembloux. It also meant
handing over half the national territory to the enemy.

The fortifications were not confined to the K.W. line.
The other positions were constantly improved. Prepara-
tions were made for extensive destructions, particularly of
roads, all along the front and in the Ardennes; all the
bridges and principal routes were mined; obstacles were
placed everywhere. On the National Railway Company’s
system alone 137 kilometres of track, 310 points and cross-
ings, and 339 bridges and tunnels had been destroyed by the
end of the May campaign.

Full advantage was taken of the months gained at the
beginning of the war— fieldworks were under construction,
reserve formations were called up and thoroughly trained,
Belgium had at that time twenty infantry divisions, one
motorized brigade, and a mechanized cavalry corps not only
well-equipped, armed and officered, but trained and familiar
with the ground. All the higher officers and many of the
reserve officers were veterans of the 1914 war; they had
taken part in the victorious offensive of 1918, and still
remembered the victory over the German armies. The
troops were proud of their strength, the worth of their
material, the soundness of their positions.

To form a strong army of 600,000, Belgium had to
mobilize 8 per cent, of her total population, or 46 per cent,
of the men between twenty and forty years of age. It was
a tremendous effort and strain (Appendix 16).

Although the soldiers’ pay and the allowances to the
families of those who were called up were relatively small,
mobilization involved financial burdens which were crushing
in comparison with Belgium’s resources. At the beginning
of 1940, the daily expenditure, including extraordinary
expenditure on fortifications, was 21 million francs. Other

18 BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT

extraordinary expenditure amounted to 3-5 million francs a
day ; the ordinary budget was 12 thousand million francs per
annum; the total estimated to be borne by the State in
1941 amounted to nearly 21 thousand million francs.

Though great sacrifices were made, the national defences
were not complete. The Air Force was not up to the same
standard as the Army. The reason is simple. Technical
progress is so rapid that air material is soon out of date
It has therefore to be written off after a short time, and
this entails considerable expense. The Army had British
machines, and when the danger became more acute, Belgium
tried to obtain more. But British industry had to meet
pressing national requirements, and the Belgian Army was
only able to obtain a few Hurricanes.

Another factor had to be taken into account. The
aerodromes of a frontier country like Belgium are highly
exposed, because of their proximity to the German bases.
Belgian material, despite the precautions taken, was in
danger of being destroyed during a sudden attack. In any
event, in such a contingency, Belgium could not expect’ to
defend herself without help. She was counting on the aid
of the Powers that had given their guarantee. In the air,
this help appeared to be possible at once. Belgium was
justified in relying on the French and British Air Forces to
defend her skies.

Although Belgian air power was weak, Belgium did her
duty, thanks to her fully organized observer corps and to the
courage of her pilots, when belligerent aircraft flew over her
territory.

In taking steps to safeguard the defences of the country
she followed the dictates of conscience as to her duty
to herself and to other States. She was convinced that
Belgian interests were the same as the interests of the
owers with whom she sympathized. Parliamentary de-
bates, Government declarations in both France and England,
left no doubt that the rearmament of these Powers was not
up to the same standard as that of Germany. It was known
that the industrial mobilization and material assistance of

BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT 19

I lie United States would not be fully effective for a long time.
During that period, Belgium protected the vital areas of
I ii gland and France. As far as the latter was concerned, a
I ; rench General remarked in a well-known book that Belgian
neutrality, as long as it was respected, “ would strengthen
Prance considerably ... by reducing the length of our front
of 250 kilometres which the Belgian Army could not hold
alone.” 1

Great prominence had been given in the Belgian Press,
during the spring of 1940, to statements made in England
according to which it was fortunate that Germany had
not launched a full-scale attack on the western front at
the beginning of the war. It was said that time had thus
been given to France and England to pursue the mobiliza-
tion of their national resources and bring their war effort
to the maximum.

Eminent French publicists have since disclosed that M.
Daladier, President of the Council, and General Gamelin,
were concerned in the same way about their country. 2

Belgian public opinion noted with satisfaction the increas-
ing evidence that the requirements of national defence were
in keeping with her sympathies, for she did not admit that
political neutrality meant she must keep silent. “ This
voluntary neutrality,” said M. Max, Burgomaster of
Brussels, at a meeting of the Communal Council on Septem-
ber 17th, 1939, “ is fully in keeping with the dignity appro-
priate to a proud people. It does not prevent either
independence of thought, or liberty of conscience, or loyalty
to our friends.” Public opinion was suspicious of any
attempt to check these sentiments. Moreover, the Govern-
ment, though recommending moderation, affirmed the same
principle. “ No one,” said the Minister for Foreign Affairs
in the Chamber on September 19th, “ has ever maintained
that a neutral Belgian must be an indifferent Belgian. And
the history of to-day cannot efface the history of yesterday.

1 General Chauvineau, Une invasion est-elle encore possible , p. 193.

2 Elie J. Bois, Truth on the Tragedy of France , pp. 98, 170; Andr6 Maurois,
Tragedie en France, p. 77.

20 BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT

Such truths have often been proclaimed, and not a member
of the Government would deny them.” The Minister’s
words were thus in harmony with those of the Burgomaster
of Brussels.

The Government, with the approval of public opinion
was careful to see that Belgian independence and national
dignity were maintained. The Press severely criticized
German acts of aggression as well as violations of inter-
national law and of the most elementary laws of humanity.
Germany protested in vain at such freedom of opinion.'
She induced all the neutral States of Europe to prohibit the
sale of the books which were most critical of the dangers and
evils of Hitler’s Reich, such as those of Dr. Rauschning and
Otto Strasser. Brussels was approached many times in the
same sense, but refused.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking in Parliament,
condemned the Russian aggression in Finland. “The
Government,” said M. Spaak, on December 19th, “is
indignant. In the same spirit of independence, speaking
in the Senate on April 16th, he expressed Belgium’s
sympathy with Norway, which had been suddenly attacked.

“ We are following Norway’s efforts all the more sympa-
thetically,” he said, “ in that she was always a great lover
of peace and was loyally neutral.” (Hear, hear. Applause
from all benches.) “ She was therefore in much the same
position as ourselves. Her sentiments were our sentiments ”
(Appendix 14).

The Minister did not stop there. He warned Belgium
of the lesson to be learnt from this bitter experience. “ What
strikes me most,” he said, “ in Norway’s heroic stand is that
love of peace, respect for neutrality, the often-repeated desire
to spare one’s country the horrors of war do not in any way
diminish but rather heighten the fierce determination to
defend the soil of the Fatherland when it becomes necessary.”
(Loud applause.)

Belgium has sometimes been classed with the small States
determined to defend themselves to the last against an
attack, but equally determined not to anticipate aggression.

BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT 21

This is a view that calls for correction. The moment the
conflict broke out, Belgium realized that the Netherlands
might be attacked while she herself was spared, at least for
I lie time being. On several occasions — particularly at the
end of October — there were grave reports which appeared to
confirm this supposition. Holland appeared at that time to
be in far graver danger than Belgium. On November 6th,
King Leopold left for The Flague. Although his interview
with Queen Wilhelmina was about the Netherlands proposal
that they should renew their offer of good offices, it is
significant that he was accompanied by the General who
was his Military Adviser. The Government discussed the
attitude to be adopted in such a contingency, but although
the discussion was secret, considerable space was devoted to
it in the international Press. The resolutions adopted were
outlined in the Chamber on December 19th in a speech by
the Minister for Foreign Affairs. “ I want,” said M. Spaak,
“ to be quite free to form a judgment in the light of all the
facts. For that reason, I think it would be unwise to decide
now what attitude we should have to adopt if the situation
in Holland changes. But I should like to make it clear that
it would be madness to suppose such an event would leave
us indifferent. As far as I am concerned — and I am sure
I am speaking for the whole Government — I am deeply
conscious of all the ties that bind Belgium and the Nether-
lands ” (Appendix 12). There was no doubt as to the
meaning of these words. They were loudly applauded.
Such an attitude fully conforms to the “ policy of inde-
pendence ” as understood by the Belgian Government.
Public opinion was almost unanimous in approving it;
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking in the Senate on
April 17th, three weeks before the aggression, fully con-
firmed his earlier statements.

Was it necessary to do more ?

On several occasions Belgium believed she was on the
verge of being attacked by Germany. She had been made
aware that such an attack had been closely studied. She
had not remained passive. She had drawn all the conclu-

22 BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT

sions which her concern for her security forced upon her.

On the outbreak of the conflict, the Belgian forces were
placed in such a way as to protect all the frontiers. The
Government intended to act strictly in accordance with the
correct and loyal attitude she had always adopted. But
once a powerful German Army was concentrated near
Belgian territory and the representatives of the Reich them-
selves seemed to think there might be an attack, the King,
with the full approval of the Government, felt quite justified
in diverting the whole of the Belgian forces to where the
danger undoubtedly threatened. The units in the west were
withdrawn and sent to the east. On several occasions, the
Reich made remarks or criticisms on this subject. The
Belgian Government constantly refused to take account of
them, as it felt that the steps taken were fully justified by the
German Army’s preparations for aggression.

Belgium had yet another cause for anxiety, in addition to
the impending danger. She was unable to meet aggression
by herself. Great Britain and France had undertaken to
assist her, but to be effective help had to be prompt.
Arrangements were therefore made by the High Command
for this purpose, though in keeping with the role Belgium
had adopted. The Minister of National Defence, General
Denis, gave Parliament a formal assurance. “ The respon-
sible Belgian authorities,” he said, on February 7th, 1940,
“ will neglect no steps to enable the Powers that have
guaranteed Belgium to fulfil their obligations towards us.”
From 1914 to 1936 — twenty-two years — the Belgian General
Staff maintained close contact with the French General Staff.

The Belgian Command had received from the Commander-
in-Chief of the Franco-British Army an assurance that he
had at his disposal everything that was necessary to ensure
that the help to Belgium be rendered without delay. Events
proved that he was right. On May 10th, the French and
British forces took up their positions within the time-limit
laid down.

Belgium was discreetly advised to seek Franco-British aid
without awaiting an act of aggression. She did not accept

BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT 23

this advice, which she regarded as incompatible with the
attitude she intended loyally to maintain. Moreover, it had
grave disadvantages. On several occasions, she was under
the impression that preventive intervention by France and
Great Britain was just what the Germans were secretly
hoping for. The German Army was concentrated on the
Belgian frontier, ready to launch an attack. If the French
and British Armies had entered Belgian territory, the German
attack would have followed immediately and the advantage
gained by them would have been slight. The Government
knew that these armies could not go beyond the K.W.
line. To appeal for preventive aid would have entailed the
occupation of half the country by the German invaders.
The only result would have been to set in motion earlier the
events that occurred in May. The course of these events
would not have been changed, because it was due to factors
outside Belgium’s control. The chief cause was the great
superiority which the Powers who were the guardians of
peace had allowed the aggressive Powers to acquire. There
was in particular the weakening of France, which, on the
eve of the German aggression, manifested itself by more and
more disquieting signs : a ministerial crisis, a crisis of the
High Command, and the weakening of the will to conquer.

The Government could not have prevented the disasters
that occurred in May, but an appeal for preventive aid would
have given them an entirely different meaning and the people
would have endured them with far less fortitude.

The case of Belgium would have become far less clear,
and from then on would have been open to discussion.
Germany, relying on the Declaration of 1937, would have
represented Franco-British intervention as justifying her
own aggression. She would have accused Belgium of failing
to keep her promises and of being responsible for her own
troubles. Towards neutral countries and towards herself
Belgium would have ceased to be what she was in 1914, a
loyal nation, a nation that had been attacked, though no
shadow of blame attached to her.

The military defeat, the piercing of the French lines on the
3

24 BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT

BELGIUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONFLICT 25

Meuse, the subsequent enemy occupation, would not have
been avoided . But Belgium would not have had the support,
in these terrible trials, of the moral force generated by her
attitude.

One of the chief objectives in 1936, as has been seen, was
to assemble all the national forces before the danger, and so
to act that the nation would arise as one man against
aggression, just as it did in 1914, though this time with an
infinitely more powerful and better-trained army.

This result was fully achieved. At the beginning of the
conflict a Coalition Government was set up in which the
three political parties were represented. The whole world
heard the proud words in which the King himself gave the
watchword : “ If we were attacked,” he said on October
27th, “ — and may God preserve us from that fate — in spite
of the solemn and categorical undertakings given to us in
1937 and renewed just before the war, we should fight with-
out hesitation, but with ten times the means. And this time
again the whole country would be behind the Army ”
(Appendix 10).

Never did foreign policy meet with such general approval
in Belgium. It is only necessary to read the debates in
the Senate on April 16th and 17th, three weeks before
the aggression. There had been growing approval from the
beginning of the conflict; even those who were formerly
critical fully approved. “ I am the more qualified to say
what I think of this policy,” said a Walloon Socialist senator,
“ in that I was opposed to it at the beginning. Confusing
independence with neutrality, I told myself that neutrality
was something shady and cowardly. But after these dread-
ful events which have made the human conscience bleed, I
have realized that I was mistaken, and for the past eight
months I have felt sure our young King was right.” (Hear,
hear.) “ And, old republican as I am, I thank him.”

The debate closed with a vote that was almost unanimous
— 131 for and only 3 Communists against. There were two
abstentions.

The Government would not have been able to carry the

nation with it on any other policy, even if it had wanted to
do so; had it tried, the attempt would have led to serious
internal dissension and confusion, the consequences of which
might have been fatal. National unity would have been
impaired, and by that very fact the country’s power of
resistance would have been weakened.

On the contrary, at the moment of supreme trial, the
whole country, except for a few scattered elements of little
importance, was resolved and united as it had never been
at any previous period of its history. The Rexist Party,
which had Fascist leanings, and had had a passing success
five years before, at the height of the economic depression,
was completely broken up. Most of its representatives had
openly supported the national union ; this was also true of
the Flemish nationalists, who represented the extremist
element in Flemish public opinion. The fifth column was
represented only by scattered individuals; it was not able
to demonstrate openly.

After the German aggression, foreign observers sometimes
asked the Belgians what good their policy of independence
and their efforts to prevent v/ar in their territory had done
them. It is true that this policy prevented neither German
aggression nor invasion. It could perhaps reduce the risk
slightly, though it could not remove it. Only the foresight
and armed force of the Great Powers could have done that.
But Belgium’s attitude and her consistency in maintaining it
were nevertheless of inestimable value to her. They cemented
national unity and strengthened the common will to resist at
a time when the country was about to face one of the most
terrible ordeals of its history : an aggression of unparalleled
violence, the brutal onslaught of an unexpected and un-
merited disaster, the moral torture and deprivation entailed
by a new occupation, the spectre of famine. These are the
fundamental safeguards which it was essential Belgium
should have when her very existence was threatened by the
storm.

THE GERMAN AGGRESSION

27

III

THE GERMAN AGGRESSION

The final warning came at the beginning of May. On
Saturday the 4th, the Netherlands Government had news
that the Netherlands would be attacked in the next few
days. 1 Security measures were immediately reinforced,
Army leave was stopped and men on leave were recalled.
There was less tension in Belgium; public opinion was used
to these continuous alarms; it was aware that every pre-
caution had been taken, and it remained calm; security
measures were ready; the authorities were able to confine
themselves to recommending special vigilance.

There was no fresh information during the days of the
8th-9th. In private conversations, Axis diplomats were
reassuring.

On the evening of the 9th, secret information came through
that the aggression would occur at dawn on the following
day. In previous months, the Belgian authorities had
received similar information. At about ten o’clock, guards
at different points on the frontier began to report that they
could hear confused noises in German territory: footsteps,
voices, motors, and moving traffic. At about eleven o’clock,
the Luxemburg authorities were informed that National
Socialists in the Grand Duchy had been warned.

These signs were a disquieting confirmation of the earlier
information. The authorities were at once notified. At
midnight the Prime Minister, the Minister of National
Defence, the Minister of Justice, the Principal Private
Secretary, and the Secretary of the King, the Military
Attorney-General, met in the office of the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, who had with him his chief collaborators.
They discussed the situation quietly and awaited information.
It was not the first time since the beginning of the conflict

1 Van Kleffens, The Rape of the Netherlands , p. 102.

26

that similar circumstances had brought them together in
this room in the middle of the night. Outside, the sleeping
town lay silent. At about one o’clock, the Belgian Minister
at Luxemburg telephoned that clashes had occurred between
the police and National Socialist formations who were trying
to seize by force the barriers put up on the main roads
leading to the German frontier.

From two o’clock in the morning, the Dutch wireless
stations announced, time after time, that aeroplanes going
from east to west were flying over various localities in the
Netherlands. It was impossible to ascertain the importance
and significance of this information, but all the signs pointed
in the same direction. The Government decided there and
then to introduce a state of siege and to arrest suspected
persons in the eastern provinces so as to prevent internal
action against our lines of defence.

As the night wore on, there was a fairly long lull. When
dawn was about to break, the peace of the capital had not
been disturbed.

From 4.30 information was received which left no shadow
of doubt : the hour had struck. Aircraft were first reported
in the east. At five o’clock came news of the bombing of
two Netherlands aerodromes, the violation of the Belgian
frontier, the landing of German soldiers at the Eben-Emael
Fort, the bombing of the Jemelle station.

While the Minister of National Defence was checking this
information, Brussels was suddenly awakened to a radiant
dawn at 5.17 a.m. by the mournful sound of the sirens, and
soon the windows at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where
the chief members of the Government were still assembled,
were shaken by the firing of anti-aircraft artillery and
German bombs dropped on the Evere aerodrome and on
several parts of the town.

It was at once decided to appeal to Belgium’s guarantors,
and this was done.

At 8.30 the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. When he entered the Minister’s room, he
began to take a paper from his pocket. M. Spaak stopped

28

THE GERMAN AGGRESSION

THE GERMAN AGGRESSION

29

him : “ I beg your pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I will speak
first.” And in an indignant voice, he read the Belgian
Government’s protest: “Mr. Ambassador, the German
Army has just attacked our country. This is the second
time in twenty-five years that Germany has committed a
criminal aggression against a neutral and loyal Belgium.
What has just happened is perhaps even more odious than
the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no note, no protest
of any kind has ever been placed before the Belgian Govern-
ment. It is through the attack itself that Belgium has learnt
that Germany has violated the undertakings given by her
on October 13th, 1937, and renewed spontaneously at the
beginning of the war. The act of aggression committed by
Germany, for which there is no justification whatever, will
deeply shock the conscience of the world. The German
Reich will be held responsible by history. Belgium is
resolved to defend herself. Her cause, which is the cause
of Right, cannot be vanquished.”

The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had
brought: “I am instructed by the Government of the
Reich,” he said, “ to make the following declaration : In
order to forestall the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and
Luxemburg, for which Great Britain and France have been
making preparations clearly aimed at Germany, the Govern-
ment of the Reich is compelled to ensure the neutrality of
the three countries mentioned by means of arms. For this
purpose, the Government of the Reich will bring up an armed
force of the greatest size, so that resistance of any kind
will be useless. The Government of the Reich guarantees
Belgium’s European and colonial territory, as well as her
dynasty, on condition that no resistance is offered. Should
there be any resistance, Belgium will risk the destruction of
her country and the loss of her independence. It is there-
fore in the interests of Belgium that the population be called
upon to cease all resistance and that the authorities be given
the necessary instructions to make contact with the German
Military Command.”

In the middle of this communication, M. Spaak, who had

by his side the Secretary-General of the Department,
interrupted the Ambassador: “Hand me the document,”
he said. “ I should like to spare you so painful a task.”
After studying the note, M. Spaak confined himself to
pointing out that he had already replied by the protest he
had just made.

During the morning, a fuller note of protest was addressed
to the representatives of all the foreign Governments
(Appendix 17). Most of them, though neutrals, at once
informed Belgium of their sympathy.

In the note which the German Government instructed
the German Ambassador to hand in, no definite complaint
was made to justify the aggression against Belgium. At the
very moment when her aeroplanes were bombing peaceful
sleeping citizens, Germany once again represented herself
as the protector of their neutrality. Already, however, the
German News Service (D.N.B.) had forwarded a com-
munication throwing responsibility for the invasion on the
victim. Later on, the Reich published a White Book con-
taining charges of alleged collusion between Belgium, Great
Britain, and France. Of the twenty documents reproduced,
there are only two which come from a Belgian military
authority. They relate to operations to be carried out on
Belgian or Dutch territories; but all of them are purely
defensive, and they are clearly intended to deal with German
aggression against Belgium and Holland.

On the basis of the declarations of the Minister of National
Defence in the Chamber on February 7th, 1940, the German
Government accused the Belgian Government of organizing
her defences exclusively against the Reich. The open
threats against Belgium from the end of October 1939 amply
justified the decision of the High Command to draw up
the Army along the frontier, where preparations for an
attack were being made. The plan of these preparations
had fallen into the hands of the Belgian authorities at the
beginning of January, This document, three-parts burnt,
is attached (Appendix 13). It is undoubtedly of an aggres-
sive nature. The offensive manoeuvres which were to be

30

THE GERMAN AGGRESSION

THE GERMAN AGGRESSION

31

carried out by the German western army were not intended
to counter an invasion of Belgium by French and British
forces ; they were designed, on the contrary, to crush the
Belgian Army before Allied help could arrive.

The document, about which the German Government has
never been able to furnish any explanation, definitively settles
the question of responsibility.

In any case, there could be no justification, in Belgium’s
view, for the surprise attack made on the country at dawn,
when official relations between the two countries were quite
normal. Belgium knew she was innocent. When the fight
began, the King was able to remind his people of the Belgium
of 1914, and to show that now as then she was resolute and
blameless.

“ For the second time in a quarter of a century,” he said,
“ Belgium — a neutral and loyal country — has been attacked
by the German Empire in spite of the most solemn under-
takings contracted before the whole world. The Belgian
people, who are fundamentally peaceful, have done every-
thing in their power to prevent this, but between sacrifice
and dishonour the Belgian of 1940 hesitates no more than
did the Belgian of 1914. . . . France and Great Britain have
promised to help us. Their advance troops are already
pushing forward to join up with ours. The fight will be
hard. Great sacrifices and deprivation will be asked of you,
but there can be no doubt about the final victory. I intend
to remain faithful to my constitutional oath to maintain the
independence and integrity of the territory. Like my father
in 1914, 1 have put myself at the head of our Army with the
same faith, with the same clear conscience. The cause of
Belgium is pure. With the help of God it will triumph ”
(Appendix 18).

The Council of Ministers met at the beginning of the
morning and were informed of the events of the night before
and of the appeal addressed immediately to the guarantor
Powers. Parliament met in the afternoon. It approved
unanimously the steps taken by the Government to meet
the aggression.

No doubt the nation had hoped to the end that Belgium
would be spared war, but during those long months on the
brink of danger, it had become familiar with the idea that
the fateful hour might strike at any time. It remained calm
and well-disciplined. Everyone did his duty.

The German air-raid shortly after dawn caused many
deaths. A Government declaration emphasized that
Brussels was an open town and that there were no troops
there. The Belgian Ambassador in London was instructed
at the same time to ask urgently for immediate aid from the
British Air Force.

From an early hour, there was violent fighting on the
frontier. It was learnt that, taking advantage of a surprise
attack at the end of the night, air-borne detachments played
an important role. The public became obsessed with the
idea of parachutists. Nowhere inside the country, however,
did enemy agents dare — as in the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
burg and on an even more extensive scale in Norway and
Holland — to commit acts of sabotage or violence.

Only one thing mattered: the defence at all costs of
Belgium’s independence. It seemed incredible that there
could be any doubt as to the attitude to be adopted. As
those who some years earlier had defined Belgium’s position
had hoped, duty was quite clear to all, in the light of the facts.

IV

HOW THE BELGIAN ARMY DEFENDED
THE TERRITORY

Now it was for the Army to make its stand against aggression
and to fulfd the mission Belgium had undertaken. On
behalf of neighbouring countries, as well as for her own
sake, she had undertaken “ to defend with all her forces
the frontiers of Belgium against any aggression or invasion
and to prevent Belgian territory from being used for the
passage of troops or as a base of operations for aggression
against another State.”

After mobilization, the Army available for carrying out
this mission consisted of :

5 Regular Army Corps and 2 Reserve Army Corps con-
sisting in all of :

12 Regular Infantry Divisions.

2 Divisions of “ Chasseurs Ardennais.”

6 Reserve Infantry Divisions.

1 Brigade of Cyclist Frontier Guards.

1 Cavalry Corps of 2 Cavalry Divisions and 1 Brigade of
Motorized Cavalry.

2 Reconnaissance Regiments (Gendarmerie).

4 Air Force Regiments.

2 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiments.

4 Army Artillery Regiments.

Army Troops (Engineers, Signals, etc.).

Fortress Troops.

Services.

The Belgian plan, in the event of a German aggression ,
provided for:

(a) A delaying position along the Albert Canal from
Antwerp to Liege and the Meuse from Liege to Namur,
which was to be held long enough to allow French and

32

33

THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

British troops to occupy the line Antwerp-Namur-Givet. 1
It was anticipated that the forces of the guarantor Powers
would be in action on the third day of invasion.

(, b ) Withdrawal to the Antwerp-Namur position.

(c) The Belgian Army was to hold the sector-exclusive
Louvain, inclusive Antwerp— as part of the main Allied
defensive position.

During the evening of May 9th, the Belgian Military
Attache in Berlin intimated that the Germans intended to
attack on the following day. Offensive preparations and
troop movements on the Belgian frontier confirmed this
information.

May 10th . — At ten minutes past twelve (midnight) on
May 10th, General Headquarters gave the alarm. For the
third time since mobilization had taken place, the Belgian
troops took up their war stations (Map 1).

At four o'clock , without ultimatum or declaration of war,
a powerful German Air Force bombed and machine-gunned
the aerodromes, stations, and communication centres. The
Belgian Air Force, taken by surprise, lost over half its
machines on the ground.

First Phase: Defence of the Delaying Position and
Withdrawal to the Main Position Antwerp-Namur

May 1 0r/2-l 3 rA (Maps 1, 2, and 3).— An unusually daring
coup de main was carried out on the front Eben-Emael-
Vroenhoven-Veldwezelt-Briedgen (Map 2), where one
salient of our defensive position skirting the frontier of
Holland could not be covered by outposts. Troops
transported by gliders were landed behind the bridges of
Yroenhoven, Veldwezelt, and Briedgen, whilst German

1 It should be noted that, in accordance with the accepted principle of
the Belgian Army, there was only one order— to resist to the end. .

Chapter V, “ The Defensive and Retreat,” Article 168 of the Belgian
Field Service Regulations prescribes that: “ In the event of an attack, it
shall be compulsory to resist to the end. The Commander-in-Chiei alone
shall reach a decision as to the expediency of ceasing resistance on any position
and as to the moment at which it should cease.”

34 THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

aircraft incessantly bombarded the whole of the sector.
The glider troops, reinforced by parachutists, surprised the
detachments guarding the bridges and captured them from
the rear. The artillery of the fort of Eben-Emael, covering
these bridges, had already been put out of action by a new
method of warfare. A few gliders, taking advantage of the
dark, landed on the roof of the fort. Their crews succeeded,
by means of explosives, in putting out of action or damaging
the defensive armament of the fort.

Transport aircraft showered parachutists on Eben-Emael.
These parachutists established themselves on the fort,
entered through the breaches, and began to destroy the
galleries, while the aerial bombardment was continued,
with redoubled intensity, on neighbouring units of the fort,
and especially on the artillery, so as to prevent them from
giving any help.

The Belgian Army could not by itself fulfil its mission
of throwing back the aggressor. In their Declaration on
April 24th, 1937, Great Britain and France had confirmed
their promise to assist Belgium, as provided in the Locarno
agreements. While the fort of Eben-Emael and the neigh-
bouring units were fully engaged in battle, in very difficult
circumstances, the Government appealed to the guarantor
Powers.

In an Order of the Day, General Gamelin said: “The
attack we have been expecting since last October began this
morning.”

As promised by the Minister of National Defence in
Parliament on February 7th, the authorities had neglected
no step to enable the guarantor Powers to fulfil their
obligations. Our southern frontier was opened to the
French and British Armies, which were to occupy the
positions assigned to them, according to a carefully thought-
out plan.

The heads of motorized columns of the Seventh French
Army (General Giraud) began an advance into Holland in
the direction of Breda and Tilburg to defend the mouths of
the Scheldt and Zeeland.

N S 2.MAY 10,1940

EBEN-EMAEL-VROENHOVEN-VELDWEZELT- BRIEGDEN

35

THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

In the evening mobile troops of the B.E.F. (General Gort)
took up a position on the Dyle between Wavre and Louvain,
while the Prioux Cavalry Corps, preceding the First French
Army (General Blanchard) reached the Wavre-Namur line.
A group of light divisions belonging to the Second French
Army (General Huntzinger) advanced into Belgian Luxem-
burg in the direction of Marche, Bastogne, and Arlon.
It encountered strong enemy resistance, and was brought
back in the evening to the Etalle-Neufchateau line.

The light troops of the Ninth French Army (General
Corap) reached the Ourthe cutting (see Map 1).

Early on the morning of May 10th, the King had gone
to his General Headquarters at Breendonck, near Antwerp.

May Uth.— By taking the bridges at Vroenhoven, Veld-
wezelt, and Briedgen, and putting the fort of Eben-Emael
out of action, the enemy obtained a footing on the left bank
of the Albert Canal on the front held by the 7th Infantry
Division.

The regiments in this division (2nd Grenadier Regiment
at Canne, 1 8th of the Line at Vroenhoven, 2nd Carabineers at
Veldwezelt-Briedgen) held on to their positions desperately.
In spite of an aerial bombardment of unparalleled violence,
in spite of disorganization in the rear and of the disorganiza-
tion caused by enemy parachutists, there were many counter-
attacks for the purpose of retaking the bridges. By dint
of heroic efforts, the bridge at Briedgen was retaken and
destroyed. But the enemy had had time to establish firmly
anchored bridgeheads at Vroenhoven and Veldwezelt. His
supporting fire and still more his fighter aircraft tied down
the Belgian battalions and inflicted heavy losses on them.
The intervention of our reserves and motorized troops
recalled from the Ardennes did not succeed in restoring
the situation. A Belgian squadron, offering itself up as a
sacrifice, flew over and bombed the bridge o± Vroenhoven:
eleven machines out of twelve were brought down.

There was no response, up to midday, to the requests
addressed to the British and French Commands asking for
bomber aircraft. It was not until the morning of May 12th

36 THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

that the R.A.F. set out on its expedition to bomb the
Maastricht bridges.

From the very beginning, the German Air Force had
an overwhelming superiority. There was never to be an
opportunity of wresting from it, even locally, the mastery
of the air. Its action was favoured by specially good
weather conditions throughout the eighteen days of the
campaign. For eighteen days the Belgian Army had the
depressing feeling that it was manoeuvring and fighting
under a sky that belonged exclusively to the enemy.

After resisting desperately for thirty-six hours, the 7th
Infantry Division withdrew. The fort of Eben-Emael fell.
The enemy armoured divisions hurled through the gap,
advanced beyond Tongres, threatening to envelop the whole
of the Albert Canal position and the fortified town of Liege.
The withdrawal of the 7th Infantry Division was followed
by that of the 4th Infantry Division on its left.

May 12 th. — On the evening of May 11th, the High Com-
mand decided to withdraw our troops behind the Antwerp-
Namur line.

Beginning on the night of May 1 1th— 12th, our forces
deployed on the Albert Canal and the Meuse gradually
withdrew, covered by a network of demolitions and by
rearguards posted astride Tongres, then on the line of the
Gette.

During the day of May 1 2th, there was a conference between
King Leopold, General Van Overstraeten, M. Daladier,
General Georges, General Billotte, General Champon, and
General Pownall, Chief of the British General Staff, at the
Chateau of Casteau, near Mons. The King and General
Pownall agreed that General Billotte, commanding the
French Northern Army Group, should be delegated by
General Georges 1 “ to ensure that the operations of the
Allied Armies in Belgium and Holland were co-ordinated.”

The Belgian Army reorganized in order to range itself
in good order on the prepared position from Antwerp to

1 General Georges commanded the North-Eastern Army Group, that is
all the French and British Forces opposite the German frontier.

THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM 37

Louvain. The Third Army Corps had evacuated the fortified
town of Liege in order to escape being encircled. But the
forts, with the exception of Eben-Emael, held on and acted
as strong-points, hindering the invader’s communications.

Colonel Modart, one of the defenders of Loncin in 1914,
who was now commanding the Liege Fortress Regiment,
followed General Leman’s example, and shut himself up in
the Flemalle fort to direct and to put heart into the defence.

The British Army had three divisions in position on the
Louvain-Wavre front. Six other divisions were echeloned
in depth between the Dyle and the Scheldt.

The First French Army, covered in the direction of Tirle-
mont-Huy by a cavalry corps, reached its dispositions on
the Wavre-Gembloux-Namur front.

The Namur position, defended by the Seventh Belgian
Army Corps (8th Infantry Division, 2nd Division of “ Chas-
seurs Ardennais,” 12th French Infantry Division), absorbed
also the troops of the Keyaerts group (1st Division of
“ Chasseurs Ardennais ”), who fought a delaying action
throughout the whole depth of the Ardennes and did
considerable demolition work.

In the south, the Ninth French Army established itself
on the Meuse from Namur to Mezieres. In Holland, the
situation was not clear. Air-borne troops which landed at
The Hague and at Rotterdam paralysed the defence,
preventing the Allies from making contact with the main
Netherlands forces. The Seventh French Army was faced
by superior forces which emerged from the Peel marshes.

In short, in spite of the fall of Eben-Emael and the loss
of two bridges, the Belgian Army carried out the only
independent mission for which it was responsible— it held
on to the Liege and Albert Canal position for long enough
to enable the bulk of the Allied forces to occupy the Antwerp-
Namur-Givet line.

In accordance with the decisions reached at Casteau, it
was henceforward to take part in the general plan of the
Allied forces.

May 13 th (Map 3).— While the greater part of the Belgian

38 THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

Army, already in position, feverishly organized the defence
of the Antwerp-Louvain position, detachments of our
cavalry corps posted as rearguards on the Gette were
responsible for covering the withdrawal of our rearmost
divisions. Violent fighting took place at Haelen and
Tirlemont, where the 2nd Regiment of Guides and the 1st
and 2nd Carabineer Cyclists particularly distinguished
themselves.

The King issued the following proclamation to the troops :
“ Soldiers,

“ The Belgian Army, brutally assailed by an un-
paralleled surprise attack, grappling with forces that are
better equipped and have the advantage of a formidable
air force, has for three days carried out difficult operations,
the success of which is of the utmost importance to the general
conduct of the battle and to the result of the war,

“ These operations require from all of us — officers and
men — exceptional efforts, sustained day and night, despite
a moral tension tested to its limits by the sight of the
devastation wrought by a pitiless invader.

“ However severe the trial may be, you will come through
it gallantly.

Our position improves with every hour * our ranks are
closing up. In the critical days that are ahead of us, you
will summon up all your energies, you will make every
sacrifice, to stem the invasion.

“ Just as they did in 1914 on the Yser, so now the French
and British troops are counting on you: the safety and
honour of the country are in your hands.

“ Leopold.”

Alarming news came from the French front. At seven
o’clock the Germans had attacked the Ninth French Army
at Houx — where only the advanced troops were in position
— and infiltrated into the valley of the Meuse from Yvoir
to Givet. An enemy attack supported by artillery and a
very powerful air force on the Second Army front seized

\ H o i l' AND

39

THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

Sedan at 5 p.m. and made a breach in which a formidable
inass of armoured divisions concentrated.

Was not the German attack to the north of the Meuse
simply a diversion to deprive the Allied centre of its reserves ?

Second Phase: The Break-through at Sedan and the
German Push to the Channel, involving the
Abandonment of the Antwerp-Namur Position,
May 14 th to 20th. (Map No. 4)

May 14 th, 15th, and \6th .— Confining itself to exerting a
firm pressure on the Belgian-British front, the enemy
directed its main effort against the French Armies.

Between the Sambre and the Meuse, the French Ninth
Army broke up in disorder. General Giraud, who had just
been given the Command, was captured on the 16th at
La Capelle.

The irresistible drive of the Panzer Divisions thrown into
the Sedan breach seriously threatened to envelop the whole
of the Allied troops engaged in Belgium. This led the
Commander-In-Chief of the Allied Armies on the evening
of the 15th to a decision which had very important results
—the abandonment of the Antwerp-Namur position and
a withdrawal behind the Escaut ; that is to say, the abandon-
ment, without any real resistance, of a powerfully organized
position and the taking up of an improvised position.

The fortified position of Namur, isolated by the French
withdrawal, was abandoned. The forts, as at Liege, acted
as strong-points and held up the enemy’s advance. The
withdrawal of the Seventh Belgian Army Corps, which was
endangered by the speed with which the French withdrew,
was only possible thanks to the skilful dispositions of its
Commander, General Deffontaine.

The Seventh French Army, unable by its offensive in
Zeeland to prevent the capitulation of the Netherlands Army,
fell back in disorder on Antwerp. Most of it was diverted
as reinforcements in the direction of the First Army.

The magnificent resistance put up by the Liege forts was

4

40 THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

recognized by this message from the King on the 16th:

“ Colonel Modart, commanding the Liege Fortress
Regiment. Officers, non-commissioned officers and men
ol the Liege fortifications, resist to the last for your country.

“ I am proud of you.

“ Leopold.”

The resistance put up by the Liege and Namur forts came
up to the expectations of the King and the Army. The fort
of Chaudfontaine did not fall until the 17th, Pontisse and
Barchon until the 18th, Evegnee until the 19th, Neufchateau
until the 21st, Pepinster (Commandant A. Devos) was still
holding out on the 28th.

At Namur, the fort of Marchovelette fell on the 18th,
Suarlee on the 19th, St. Heribert and Malonne on the 21st,
Dave, Maizeret, and Andoy on the 23rd.

May Mth to 20 th (Map 4). — During the night of the
16th— 17th, the French and British withdrew behind the
Willebroeck Canal.

In the general retreat, the Belgian Army withdrew, step
by step, to Ghent and Termonde in three phases :

(a) Behind the Willebroeck Canal.

(b) Behind the Dendre.

(c) Behind the Scheldt.

Violent fighting took place on the Nethe, the Rupel, the
Willebroeck Canal, the Scheldt, Flanders Head, and on the
Dendre. During the fighting, the Belgian artillery gave
many proofs of its worth.

For three days from May 18th to 20th — our divisions,
disposed in good order on the Escaut and the Ghent
bridgehead, held out against every attack, while the
manoeuvre which was to end in the breaking up of the
Allied armies into two groups was developing on the Oise.

The British communique of May 21st paid tribute to the
bearing of the Belgian Army in these words :

“ The Belgian Army has contributed largely towards the
success of the defensive battle now being fought.”

On the evening of the 18th, the Panzer Divisions

THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM 41

approached Peronne. There was nothing to stop their
rapid advance. The King had warned his Ministers that
a final breach of the Allied front was not impossible, and
that this would lead to the isolation of the Belgian Army
and part of the French and British Armies, and might have
serious consequences, that is to say, capitulation.

On the 19th, M. Gutt, Minister of Finance, who was on
a mission to Paris, drew the attention of M. Reynaud,
President of the Council, to the growing danger to the
Belgian Army, which was exposed to envelopment with all
its consequences. He pressed for urgent decisions by the
High Command in order to avert the impending disaster.

On May 20th, hearing of the fall of Cambrai and of the
German threat to Abbeville, and aware of the state of
exhaustion of the French northern forces, the King informed
London of his anxiety.

Third Phase: Attempt to counter-attack to reunite
the Allied Front. Mission of the Belgian Army :

TO COVER THIS OPERATION BY DEFENDING THE LYS ON

a Front extended from 50 to 90 km. ( May 20 th
to 24 th)

May 21 st . — On May 21st, the Germans entered Amiens
and Montreuil: a strategic situation of the utmost gravity
was thus created. It was in these dramatic circumstances that
General Weygand, recalled from Syria, succeeded General
Gamelin as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

Exposed to the full onslaught of the enemy, the British
left the Escaut and fell back to the Lys, and this compelled
us to take a new line on the Lys, while at the same time we
had to protect ourselves from Walcheren Island, which had
fallen on the 19th.

On the same day, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief held
a conference at Ypres. General Weygand’s plan for a
double counter-attack to restore the Allied front on the
Arras-Albert line was discussed. It was agreed that the
Belgian Army should extend its front in order to release

42

THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

some of the British troops to take part in these operations.
The Belgian Army was also to cover these operations by
holding the line of the Lys, extending in the north to the

mouth of the Escaut, and eventually to withdraw to the
Yser.

_ May 22nd . — The French and British attempts to re-estab-
lish contact with their armies on the Somme drew the bulk
of their forces in the direction of Arras. Twice the Belgian
front was weakened by an extension to the south, and on
May 22nd it held a front over 90 km. long.

The Franco-British attack under command of General
Blanchard made some progress. The French light
mechanized units reached the Sensee, in the direction of
Cambrai, but their thrust was broken by the German
Panzer Divisions.

At the same time, south of the Somme, General Georges
was preparing to attack north.

From north to south, the dispositions of the Belgian
Forces were, first the Cavalry Corps which held the advanced
position at Terneuzen, then from north to south ranged side
by side the Fifth, Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Fourth Army
Corps. One reserve division guarded the coast.

In reserve our First Corps had only two incomplete
divisions which had been sorely tried during the preceding
encounters. The 60th French Division with two regiments
held the Leopold Canal in the district north of Bruges
behind our Cavalry Corps.

Acting on our own authority, we sent the Sixteenth French
Corps to hold the canal from Gravelines to St. Omer, in
order to secure the Lys and ensure freedom of action for
the Allied withdrawal in the south.

In these circumstances, the Belgian Army once again
accepted battle. Whilst the armoured divisions were
reported to be at Boulogne and then at St. Omer and the
French and British were trying to re-establish the connection
between Cambrai and Peronne, our troops held out
courageously, so as to give the necessary time and space for
this decisive operation.

THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM 43

It was the Belgian Army, however, which was to bear the
chief weight of the German forces in Belgium.

The picture would be incomplete if we did not mention
the complications due to a number of motor convoys and
movements of all kinds crowded along the French frontier,
which was more often closed than open; the congestion
caused by hundreds of thousands of refugees moving hither
and thither in search of a safe area, and by bombardments
which laid waste the whole of the coastal area.

May 23rd .— General Blanchard’s offensive had been
halted; it could not be resumed. In the south, General
Georges’ offensive had been stopped on the Somme ; every-
where the Germans maintained their positions on the north
bank of the river. It became obvious that the counter-
attack planned by General Weygand could not be carried
out. Similarly, a second counter-attack towards Abbeville
on the same day failed.

Enemy pressure compelled the Belgians to abandon
Terneuzen and Ghent. The British attempt to break through
at Arras had failed. The French units were not in a con-
dition to attack.

On the other hand, motorized detachments from Boulogne
and St. Pol threatened the rear of the Allies. The encircling
movement was rapidly closing in. In the air, the situation
was becoming increasingly difficult. Most of the airfields
in the north-east of France were occupied by the enemy.
There was no direct contact, and the only means of com-
munication with the R.A.F. and the French Air Force was
by wireless.

The Belgian Army was no longer allowed to use the bases
at Gravelines, Dunkirk, and Bourbourg which had been
placed at its disposal, and had only the ports of Oslend and
Nieuport left. It was compelled to move its reserves of food ,
ammunition, and oil, as well as its hospital trains, along one
of the few railway lines still usable.

May 24th — A heavy German attack forced a crossing
over the Lys on both sides of Courtrai on the front held by
the 1st and 3rd Divisions. The great battle had begun.

44 the ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

Our 10th and 9th Divisions intervened and filled the gap,
in spite of the enemy’s violent air attacks. Two hundred
prisoners were captured in a counter-attack on the front
of the Second Army Corps. Our Intelligence established
the tact that the attacking force consisted of four regular
divisions. The Belgian artillery displayed the greatest
activity m harassing the enemy day and night at all ranges.
To break down this stubborn resistance, the German General
Staff decided to resort to a mass air attack. Formations of
over fifty bombers, protected over the coast by fighters
continuously bombed and machine-gunned our lines, our
batteries, our headquarters, and our transports, preparing
the way for a deadly infantry attack employing the tactics
of infiltration. Unfortunately, in spite of our earnest
entreaties, our troops never had the benefit of any appre-
ciable help from the Allied air forces.

On May 24th, the enemy brought into line a fresh division
from Menin to Ypres which threatened to cut us off from
the British. Our 2nd Cavalry Division and our 6th Infantry
Division were brought round from our left to our right
and frustrated this attempt. In conjunction with the 10th
Infantry Division, they kept the assailant at bay on the
Yprcs-Roulers line.

Twice during the 24th, M. Gutt, Minister of Finance, who
had moved from Paris to London, saw Lord Halifax
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and considered with him what
mvasures could be taken to deal with the critical situation
in which the Belgian Army was now placed.

Fourth Phase: Failure of the Counter-offensive and
Allied Retreat to Dunkirk. Resistance of the
Belgian Army on the Lys until its means were
exhausted, May 25 th to 21th. (Map No. 5)

May 25th. The counter-offensive designed to break the
envelopment having failed, the British troops, set free by
the extension of the Belgian front which was agreed upon
at the conference in Ypres on the 21st, withdrew to Dunkirk.

THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM 45

The vice in which the British, French, and Belgian forces
were held continued to close in. From this moment, the
fate of the Belgian Army was in no doubt. All hope of
saving it disappeared. On the preceding days, the Germans
had scattered through the Belgian lines pamphlets inviting
the soldiers to lay down their arms. A rough map gave
a striking illustration of their desperate situation. “In
any case,” said the wording, “ the war is over for you.
Your leaders are about to escape by air. Throw down
your arms ! ” (Appendix 19.)

The only object of continuing the fight was to try to save
part of the Allied troops by embarking them at Dunkirk.
At dawn on May 25th, the King informed first his Ministers
and then his Army of his unshakable determination to resist
to the limit of his forces and to share in the fate of his
soldiers. His Order of the Day to the troops was as follows :

“ Soldiers,

“ The great battle which we have been expecting has
begun. It will be fierce. We will fight on with all our
strength and with supreme energy.

“ It is being fought on the ground where in 1914 we
victoriously held the invader.

“ Soldiers,

“ Belgium expects you to do honour to her Flag.

“ Officers, Soldiers,

“ Whatever may happen, I shall share your fate.

“ I call on you all for firmness, discipline, and confidence.

“ Our cause is just and pure.

“ Providence will help us.

“ Long Live Belgium!

“ Leopold.”

“ In the Field, May 25 th, 1940.”

He sent a straightforward message to London describing
the imminent danger and his own intentions. The death
of General Billotte, representative of the Commander-in-
Chief in the north, and the actual breakdown of communica-

46 THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

tions with France, prevented him from sending a similar
notification to Paris. But in Paris, as in London, the
Ministers described the situation which was causing them the
gravest anxiety.

When General Sir John Dill visited G.H.Q. on May 25th,
his attention was drawn to the possibility of a break-through
west of Menin, towards Ypres and Dunkirk, and to its
dangers. Furthermore, at about six in the evening Colonel
Davy, Head of the British Military Mission to G.H.Q., was
informed that the Belgian Army would henceforward be
quite unable to extend its front any farther.

May 26th . — During the night of the 25th-26th and the
day of the 26th, 2,000 wagons were brought up and placed
end to end to form an anti-tank barrier on the railway line
from Roulers to Ypres.

The front was giving way at Iseghem, Nevele, and Ron-
sele; the First Division of “ Chasseurs Ardennais ” restored
the position by bitter fighting at Nevele and Vynckt, but
suddenly the battle extended to the north of Eecloo. ’ The
Germans forced a crossing over the canal at Balgerhoeck.
For a moment contact with the British to the west of Menin
was lost. The last reserves were assembled, the defence of
the coast was taken over by Lines of Communication troops,
the defence of the Yser towards the south-west, carried out
up to this time by the 15th Division, was now undertaken
by units that were exhausted. Auxiliary troops formed a
bariier in the rear with 75-mm. guns taken from training
centres.

On May 26th at midday, the Belgian Command handed
the Head of the French Mission a note on the situation of
the Belgian Army which said :

“ The Belgian Command asks you to inform the Com-
mander-in-Chiefof the Allied Armies that the Belgian Army
is in a serious situation and that the Commander-in-Chief
intends to carry on the fight as long as his resources
permit. The enemy is at present attacking from Eecloo to
Menin; the Army has nearly reached the limits of its
endurance.”

THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM 47

No reply to this message was received from the Com-
mander-in-Chief.

At six o’clock in the evening General Blanchard arrived
to present himself to the King as successor to General
Billotte. He announced that the British were evacuating
the frontier position on our right and were withdrawing
farther to the rear on the Lille-Ypres line. All that could
be spared to fill the gap thus left between them and the
Belgians was a small light mechanized division with about
fifteen tanks. Moreover, in the absence of contact with
General Gort, there was no means of knowing his intentions.

On the other hand, the Belgian Command handed to the
Head of the Belgian Mission with British G.H.Q. the follow-
ing note :

“ To-day, May 26th, a very violent attack was launched
against the Belgian Army on the Menin-Nevele front, and
at the present moment fighting is continuing throughout
the whole of the Eecloo region. In the absence of Belgian
reserves, we cannot extend the boundary notified yesterday
any farther to the right. We are compelled regretfully to
say that we have no longer any forces available to bar the
way from Ypres. Furthermore, to retreat to the Yser is
impossible, since it would, without loss to the enemy,
destroy our fighting units even more rapidly than if we stand
and fight. Flooding of the Yser-Yperlee region has not
yet been begun. The ditches of the drainage-works on the
eastern bank have been filled. 1 All the preparatory work for
flooding has been completed. The order to flood the
eastern bank of the Yser, and the Yperlee, was given at
nine o’clock on May 26th. It should be noted that flooding
will be fairly slow, as this is the season of low tides. Until
further instructions, there will be no flooding to the north
of the Passchendael Canal.”

In the evening, the King decided to make arrangements
for establishing his G.H.Q. at Middelkerke, a seaside resort

i The order to prepare the flooding of the Yser had been given on May 19th.
On the 26th, the soaked ground on the east bank was sufficient to stop tanks.
All the bridges over the Yser were prepared for destruction.

48

THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

a few kilometres from Ostend, and an advanced echelon
of G.H.Q. established itself there on the 27th.

May 21th (Map No. 5).— Twenty-four hours earlier, the
Belgian Command had suggested that the British should
counter-attack between the Lys and the Escaut on the flank
and rear of the German attacking force. The British
Command replied that the expeditionary force was not in a
fit state to undertake this operation. Despite the fact that
the Allies were informed that no fresh troops were available
and that the limits of resistance were rapidly approaching,
no hope whatever of direct assistance from the French was
forthcoming. That was the situation at the beginning of
May 27th. 5

The last reserves, three weak regiments, were committed.
Somehow or other we managed on our own to maintain
contact with the British, but the enemy was determined to
break down our resistance which was delaying him and
causing him considerable losses. Our troops held along
the whole of the front. They fought their ground, yielding
only step by step under the repeated assaults of an enemy
supported by an overwhelmingly large air force; they
inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. The gunners emptied
their ammunition limbers, firing point-blank and blowing
up their guns when they were about to fall into the hands
of the enemy. Despite such heroism, by about eleven
o’clock large gaps were made on the front north of Mal-
degem, in the centre near Ursel, and to the right near Thielt
and Roulers. The enemy advanced by infiltration. In the
1 hielt region, 6 to 7 km. of the front was left undefended ;
the enemy had only to pour through to reach Bruges. At
about 12.30, the King telegraphed the following message
to General Gort :

“ The Belgian Army is losing heart. It has been fighting
without a break for the past four days under a heavy bom-
bardment which the R.A.F, has been unable to prevent.
Having heard that the Allied group is surrounded and aware
of the great superiority of the enemy, the troops have con-
cluded that the situation is desperate. The time is rapidly

LILLE

49

THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

approaching when they will be unable to continue the fight.
The King will be forced to capitulate to avoid a collapse.”
At about 2.30 p.m. the French liaison authorities were

told that :

“ Belgian resistance is at its last extremity; our front is
about to break like a worn bowstring.”

The losses were heavy. The wounded were pouring into
the hospital units which were already overflowing; many
of the guns lacked ammunition. The Army could no longer
offer organized resistance. It had its back to the sea. The
arc of fire narrowed down ; thousands of refugees and the
local population were wandering in a restricted area entirely
at the mercy of enemy guns and aircraft. More than 3
million people were crowded into less than 1,700 square km.
Many of them were homeless. Food was beginning to run

short. The Army no longer had access to a railway. The
roads were congested and traffic had great difficulty in
moving.

Our last means of resistance gave way under the crushing
weight of technical superiority. There was no hope of help
and no solution other than complete destruction. Shortly
before 4 p.m., the Belgian Command was forced to realize:
“ (1) that from the national point of view, the Belgian Army
had carried out its task ; it had resisted to the limit of its
capacity ; its units were unable to continue the fight. There
could be no retreat to the Yser ; it would do more to destroy
the units than the fighting in progress; it would increase
the congestion of the Allied forces to the highest pitcn ,
(2) from the international point of view, the despatch of an
envoy to ask for terms for the cessation of hostilities would
have the advantage of allowing the Allies the night of the
27th-28th and part of the morning of the 28th, an interval
that, if the fighting were continued, could be gained only
at the cost of the complete destruction of the Army.” There
was no possibility of embarking; indeed, even if this solution
had been possible, it would have left uncovered the retreat
of the French and British forces to Dunkirk.

At 5 p.m. the King decided that an envoy should be sent

50 THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

to the German Command to ask for an armistice between
the Belgian Army and the German Army. This decision
was at once communicated to the French and British
Missions. The Head of the French Mission, while fully
appreciating the justice of the decision, expressed the view
that the negotiations should be conducted by the three armies
in conjunction with one another. A little later a reply was
given to the effect that the mission would confine itself to
enquiring into the terms for the armistice. General
Champon said, incidentally, that he had succeeded in getting
into touch with General Weygand by wireless, but that he
had been unable to reach General Blanchard, whose G.H.Q.
was not where it was expected to be. He added that with
our approval he would place on the Yser the 60th French
Division which we had undertaken to send to Dunkirk in
Belgian lorries so that it would come directly under French
Command. Furthermore, he no longer knew where General
Gort was to be found. His G.H.Q. , which was to have
established itself at Cassel, had had to give up this idea
because of an attack by German tanks. Telephonic com-
munication was impossible, because the Lille exchange had
been destroyed.

At 5 p.m. Major-General Derousseaux, Deputy-Chief of
the General Staff, left Belgian G.H.Q. He returned at
10 p.m. fiom G.H.Q. of the Eighteenth German Army with
the reply: “ The Fulmer demands that arms be laid down
unconditionally ” (Bedingungslos).

At 11 p.m., bowing to the inevitable, the King, in full
agreement with his Chief of Staff, decided to accept the
terms and proposed that firing should cease at 4 a.m.

May 28th . — At 1.30 a.m. the Head of the French Mission,
who had moved, in the meantime, to La Panne, was informed
of the capitulation.

At 4 a.m. firing ceased along the whole of the Belgian
front, except in the Roulers-Ypres sector, where the Belgian
units had not been informed of the capitulation and con-
tinued to defend their positions until about 6 a.m.

At about 9 a.m. a message from the envoy was received

THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM 51

to the effect that the German Command demanded free
passage for its columns towards the sea. The message was
at once telephoned to the Head of the French Mission.
Shortly afterwards, communications between the repre-
sentative of the Allied Command and the Belgian Command
were finally severed by the breakdown of the telephone
system.

The Protocol signed on May 28th by General von
Reichenau for the German Army and General Derousseaux
for the Belgian Army contained the following provisions :

“ The Belgian Army shall unconditionally lay down its
arms at once and shall from that time onwards regard itself
as prisoner of war. An armistice was entered into this
morning at 5 a.m. 1 at the request of the Belgian Command.
The German operations against the British and French troops
will not be suspended.

“ Belgian territory will at once be occupied, including all
the ports. No further damage shall be done to the locks or
coastal fortifications.

“ Additional Protocol

“ 1. As a mark of honourable surrender, the Officers of
the Belgian Army shall retain their weapons.

“ 2. The Chateau of Laeken shall be placed at the dis-
posal of His Majesty the King in order that he may reside
there with his family, his military attendants and his ser-
vants.”

This painful conclusion of an eighteen-day campaign was
not unexpected. The British and French Government
authorities were duly informed of our growing exhaustion
and of our determination to defend our positions until all
our means were expended : this was done. Capitulation
was not the result of a free decision ; it occurred, at the last
extremity, under the inexorable pressure of events.

1 German summer time.

52

THE ARMY’S DEFENCE OF BELGIUM

Before parting with his Army, the King made a final
proclamation :

“ G.H.Q., May 28/fc, 1940.

“ Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Men,

“ Plunged unexpectedly into a war of unparalleled
violence, you have fought courageously to defend your
homeland step by step.

“ Exhausted by an uninterrupted struggle against an
enemy very much superior in numbers and in material, we
have been forced to surrender.

“ History will relate that the Army did its duty to the full.
Our Honour is safe.

“ This violent fighting, these sleepless nights, cannot have
been in vain. I enjoin you not to be disheartened, but to
bear yourselves with dignity. Let your attitude and your
discipline continue to win you the esteem of the foreigner.

“ I shall not leave you in our misfortune, and I shall watch
over your future and that of your families.

“ To-morrow we will set to work with the firm intention
of raising our country from its ruins.

“ Leopold.”

The Army had resisted the German aggression with all
the means in its power. Its inability to check it was due to
military events outside its control, events which occurred
elsewhere. The Army had continued to fight desperately,
despite the fact that it was irrevocably lost by the failure
of the counter-attack to check the German envelopment.
It did not lay down its arms until — with its back to the sea,
hemmed in to the last remaining strip of territory, and with
no means of escape — it could continue the struggle no longer.
As he had proclaimed in order to strengthen the courage of
his soldiers at the height of the battle, its Commander-in-
Chief has since finked up his future with that of the Army.
By his dignified attitude, in the captivity to which he has
condemned himself, by his refusal to recognize the accom-
plished fact, he has shown himself to be the incarnation of a
people which will not accept servitude.

Appendix 1

SPEECH BY THE KING TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
ON OCTOBER 14TH, 1936

Gentlemen,

In taking the constitutional oath, Belgian sovereigns under-
take to maintain the integrity and independence of their country.

I, like my predecessors, intend to keep this solemn promise.
That is why I was anxious to preside over this Council which is
to draw up measures for submission to Parliament for the purpose
of providing Belgium with a military status adapted to the present
circumstances.

For over a year already, the Government has been considering
how we can strengthen our present military position.

There were several reasons for this :

(a) German rearmament, following upon the complete
remilitarization of Italy and Russia, caused most other States,
even those that were deliberately pacific, like Switzerland and the
Netherlands, to take exceptional precautions.

( b ) There has been such a vast change in methods of warfare
as a result of technical progress, particularly in aviation and
mechanization, that the initial operations of an armed conflict
can now be of such force, speed, and magnitude as to be par-
ticularly alarming to small countries like Belgium.

(c) Our anxieties have been increased by the lightning reoccupa-
tion of the Rhineland and the fact that bases for the start of a
possible German invasion have been moved near to our frontier.

(d) At the same time, the foundations of international security
have been shaken because conventions, even conventions freely
subscribed to, have been violated, and in the present circum-
stances it is almost impossible to adapt the Covenant of the
League of Nations so as to prevent such violations.

(e) Lastly, there is a danger that the internal dissensions in
certain States may lead other States to be embroiled in rivalry
between different political and social systems and may let loose a
fiercer and more devastating conflagration than that from the
after-effects of which we are still suffering.

It might perhaps be as well to recall here the successive stages
through which the examination of the military problem has
passed during the last few months.

This summary will also show that the series of studies has now
been completed.

53

54 APPENDIX 1

The need for adjusting our military forces to meet external
risks and dangers became apparent in the spring of 1935. The
Army General Staff placed various schemes before me, and
finally, in November 1935, 1 approved of a programme the main
principles of which seemed to me to constitute a minimum.

This programme was submitted to the Government, which
formed a small committee to make a thorough investigation of
the problem of security.

On February 7th, 1936, the Cabinet Council agreed upon the
text of a draft military law ; this did not meet with the approval
of all sections of the Chamber, and the Government agreed to the
tabling of an amendment providing for the immediate application
of Article 53 of the Militia Law. The Bill as amended was passed
by the Chamber on April 6th.

Meanwhile, it was suggested on January 10th that the whole
problem should be discussed by a mixed commission.

This idea was welcomed in political and parliamentary circles.

The mixed commission was set up by Royal Decree on March
25th, 1936.

After thirty-seven meetings, during which every aspect of the
problem was discussed, the commission completed its work and
reached a number of conclusions. While there is some difference
of opinion as to their application, there is unanimity on general
principles, particularly on the need for a permanent covering
force. The main suggestions — purchases of material, anti-
aircraft defence, fortification, the calling-up system — call for an
immediate decision.

In any event, the new Militia Law must be passed before
December 1st, as the call-up of the 1937 class begins on that date.

Furthermore, in view of the dangerous international situation,
the country will expect the Government to submit the necessary
proposals to Parliament without delay. Again, the precise
nature of the problem should be explained to the public.

Our military policy, like our foreign policy, on which it
depends, must aim, not at preparing for a more or less successful
war, following upon a coalition, but at keeping war from our
territory.

The reoccupation of the Rhineland strained the Locarno
agreements in both the letter and the spirit, and we are now in
almost the same international situation as before the war.

Because of our geographical situation we need a military
machine large enough to dissuade any of our neighbours from
making use of our territory to attack another State. By the
discharge of this mission, we make a valuable contribution
towards peace in Western Europe; and ipso facto it gives us a

APPENDIX 1 55

right to the respect, and if necessary to the help, of all the States
that are interested in peace.

I believe Belgian opinion is unanimous as to these principles.
But our undertakings should not go beyond that. A unilateral
policy would weaken our position abroad and rightly or wrongly
would cause dissension at home. An alliance, even if it were
purely defensive, would not lead to the desired object; for
however promptly an ally might come to our aid, the impact of
the invasion — and it would be overwhelming— would come
first, and we should have to meet it by ourselves.

In the absence of a defence system of her own, capable of
withstanding the invader, the invasion would penetrate deeply
into Belgium at the very beginning and she would be devastated
at once. Afterwards friendly intervention might, of course, ensure
final victory, but in the process the country would suffer ravages
such as would be infinitely worse than those of the war of 1914-18.

That is why our policy must be “ solely and exclusively Bel-
gian,” as the Minister for Foreign Affairs said recently. Its
resolute aim must be to keep us out of the conflicts of our
neighbours ; it is in keeping with our national ideals. It can be
maintained by a reasonable military and financial effort, and it
will be welcomed by Belgians, all inspired by an intense and
primordial desire for peace.

Let any who doubt whether such a foreign policy is possible
consider the proud and confident example set by Holland and
Switzerland.

Let them remember how much Belgium’s scrupulous obser-
vance of her neutrality weighed in our favour and in favour of the
Allies during the whole of the war and the subsequent settlement.

Morally our position would have been incomparably weaker at
home, and the world would not have shown us so much sympathy
if the invader had been able to point to an alliance between our-
selves and one of his opponents.

It is therefore, I repeat, solely at preserving ourselves from war,
wherever it may threaten, that our military system must aim ; and
it is important that public opinion should be absolutely certain of
this.

Our military status, which derives from the 1929 Militia Law,
though excellent in various respects, is no longer suitable, having
regard to the new possibility of a sudden invasion. It secures
neither the permanent defence of our frontiers, nor safety to
mobilize, nor the concentration of the Army. A more or less
unexpected irruption might, in a few hours, seize valuable
sureties and paralyse irrevocably the greater part of our forces.

This defective machinery is in urgent need of repair. I have

5

56 APPENDIX 1

called you together so that we may decide how this shall be done.

As representatives of the three great traditional Parties, who
speak for the vast majority of Belgians, I hope you will approve
the Bill of the Minister of National Defence.

If you can unite in a spirit of high patriotic understanding to
solve the military problem, you will at the same time restore to
the country the necessary serenity of mind in the face of outward
events and the atmosphere of security essential to general
prosperity.

Thus you will once again prove to the country that the chief
preoccupation of the National Coalition Government is to put
the higher interests of Belgium above everything else.

Appendix 2

FRANCO-BRITISH DECLARATION OF APRIL 24TH,

1937 1

In accordance with instructions received from their respective
Governments, His Majesty’s Ambassador and the French
Ambassador have the honour to make the following communica-
tion to the Belgian Government :

1. The Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and of the French Republic have not failed
during the last few months to give their full attention to the desire
of the Belgian Government to have the international rights and
obligations of Belgium clarified in certain respects where this is
rendered necessary by her geographical position and by the
delays which may still occur before the negotiation and conclusion
of the general Act intended to replace the Treaty of Lausanne.

2. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Govern-
ment of the Republic, being anxious to give full expression to
their sympathy with this desire of the Belgian Government, have
agreed to make the following declaration :

3. The said Governments have taken note of the views which
the Belgian Government has itself expressed concerning the
interests of Belgium, and more particularly —

(1) The determination expressed publicly and on more than
one occasion by the Belgian Government : (a) to defend
the frontiers of Belgium with all its forces against any
aggression or invasion, and to prevent Belgian territory

1 British White Paper, Cmd. 5437.

APPENDIX 2 57

from being used, for purposes of aggression against
another State, as a passage or as a base of operations by
land, by sea, or in the air; ( b ) to organize the defence of
Belgium in an efficient manner for this purpose;

(2) The renewed assurances of the fidelity of Belgium to the
Covenant of the League of Nations and to the obligations
which it involves for Members of the League.

4. In consequence, taking into account the determination and
assurances mentioned above, the Government of the United
Kingdom and the Government of the Republic declare that they
consider Belgium to be now released from all obligations towards
them resulting from either the Treaty of Locarno or the arrange-
ments drawn up in London on March 19th, 1936, and that they
maintain in respect of Belgium the undertakings of assistance
which they entered into towards her under the above-mentioned
instruments.

5. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Govern-
ment of the Republic agree that the release of Belgium from her
obligations, as provided for in paragraph 4 above, in no way
affects the existing undertakings between the United Kingdom and
France.

Acknowledgment of Receipt 1

The Royal Government has taken note with great satisfaction
of the declaration communicated to it this day by the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. It thanks the Government of the United Kingdom
warmly for this communication.

Appendix 3

SPEECH IN THE CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES
BY M. SPAAK, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
ON APRIL 29TH, 1937

COMMUNICATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT

M. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade . —
Last Saturday M. Laroche, Ambassador of France, and Sir
Esmond Ovey, Ambassador of Great Britain, handed me the
Franco-British Declaration which you will no doubt have read
in the newspapers.

I should like, however, to remind you of it, for I want you to
1 British White Paper, Cmd. 5437.

58 APPENDIX 3

have its terms in your minds while I am speaking. It reads
as follows :

“ In accordance with instructions received from their respec-
tive Governments, His Majesty’s Ambassador and the French
Ambassador have the honour to make the following communica-
tion to the Belgian Government :

“ 1. The Governments of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and of the French Republic have
not failed during the last few months to give their full attention
to the desire of the Belgian Government to have the international
rights and obligations of Belgium clarified in certain respects
where this is rendered necessary by her geographical position
and by the delays which may still occur before the negotiation
and conclusion of the general Act intended to replace the Treaty
of Lausanne.

“ 2. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Govern-
ment of the Republic, being anxious to give full expression to
their sympathy with this desire of the Belgian Government, have
agreed to make the following declaration :

“ 3. The said Governments have taken note of the views which
the Belgian Government has itself expressed concerning the
interests of Belgium, and more particularly —

“ (1) The determination expressed publicly and on more
than one occasion by the Belgian Government : (a) to
defend the frontiers of Belgium with all its forces
against any aggression or invasion, and to prevent
Belgian territory from being used, for purposes of
aggression against another State, as a passage or as a
base of operations by land, by sea, or in the air; ( b )
to organize the defence of Belgium in an efficient
manner for this purpose;

“ (2) The renewed assurances of the fidelity of Belgium to
the Covenant of the League of Nations and to the
obligations which it involves for Members of the
League.

“ 4. In consequence, taking into account the determination
and assurances mentioned above, the Government of the United
Kingdom and the Government of the Republic declare that they
consider Belgium to be now released from all obligations towards
them resulting from either the Treaty of Locarno or the arrange-
ments drawn up in London on March 19th, 1936, and that they
maintain in respect of Belgium the undertakings of assistance
which they entered into towards her under the above-mentioned
instruments.” (Hear, hear !)

APPENDIX 3 59

“ 5 . The Government of the United Kingdom and the Govern-
of the Republic agree that the release of Belgium from her
obligations, as provided for in paragraph 4 above, in no way
affects the existing undertakings between the United Kingdom
and France.” 4 „ „ . , , «

I handed the two Ambassadors the following reply on behalf
of the Government :

“ Brussels, April 24th , 1937.

“ VrUTR P YPFT T PNCY

“The Royal Government has taken note with great
satisfaction of the declaration communicated to it this day by
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. It thanks the Government of the United
Kingdom warmly for this communication.

“ I have the honour, etc.” (More signs of approval.)

I think it only right to add to my own expression of satisfaction
the expression of Belgium’s gratitude. For some months I have
found in British and French statesmen— Mr. Eden as well as
M. Blum and M. Delbos — and also M. Laroche and Sir Esmond
Ovey, for I must not forget these good servants of their own
countries who are also great friends of ours — the most loyal and
complete spirit of understanding and collaboration. (Hear,
hear!)

Mr. Eden said the other day at Brussels :

“ Every country has different problems to face. Every
country has its own internal troubles ; every country has special
difficulties for which a special solution is necessary. In these
circumstances, we must — each in so far as we are concerned
make allowances if we are to make any progress.”

How could we fail to arrive at a solution when the statesman
with whom we discuss our problems is inspired by such concilia-
tory wisdom ? , _ . , A , - .

M. Blum and M. Delbos showed no less foresight, and what
has happened in the last few days is therefore really the result
of understanding and mutual confidence between France, Great
Britain, and Belgium.

I should like to tell you all once more m public— you who
represent the nation — that while it is true that we have been
released by our great neighbours from certain legal obligations,
they have acquired a new title to our friendship and gratitude.

(Loud applause.) .

Six days ago, then, an important change was made in our

international status.

The first question we must answer is this: Were there any

60 APPENDIX 3

reasons why we should try to define and specify our international
rights and duties in a new form ? I do not think there can be the
slightest doubt as to the importance, the absolute necessity, of
doing so.

To be sure of this we have only to remind ourselves of what
our status was before. We have only to compare the period
when it was thought out with to-day.

Belgium was happy to sign the Treaty of Locarno, and I
sincerely believe she was right to sign it, for she obtained some-
thing that was essential to her security — the guarantee of France,
Great Britain, and Italy.

However, the Treaty of Locarno imposed on us certain
obligations which, though we were able to support them ten
years ago, now seem to be far too onerous.

By the Treaty of Locarno, Belgium guaranteed to maintain
the territorial status quo arising out of the frontiers between
Germany and France and also the inviolability of those frontiers.

Thus, Belgium guaranteed France against a possible German
attack ; but — and many Belgians seem to have forgotten this —
she also guaranteed Germany against a possible French attack.

By the Treaty of Locarno, despite the fundamental differences
in our situation and in our available resources, we adopted
exactly the same attitude and obligations in Western Europe as
did our greater neighbours.

That was unquestionably daring. It is true that the atmo-
sphere in Europe, as well as certain special circumstances, were
such as to explain and justify our boldness.

The Germany of that time was almost disarmed, and there was
reason to hope that the world would be wise enough to seek
salvation in concerted and controlled disarmament. That
hope is to-day disappointed — temporarily, I hope — but truth
compels us to admit that Germany has again become a great
military nation, and that in all countries throughout the world
the armaments race has begun again with an intensity never
before equalled.

That is the first fundamental difference between 1920 and 1937.

In 1925, there was a demilitarized zone. Articles 42 and 43
of the Treaty of Versailles were still effective. Article 1 of the
Treaty of Locarno referred specifically to them. There is no
need for me to emphasize the importance of the demilitarized
zone for our military security in the event of a German attack.

In 1936, Germany reoccupied the demilitarized zone, revers-
ing the former situation and facing us with a new fact.

How could we fail to take account of it in formulating our
international status ?

APPENDIX 3

61

Lastly, in 1925 Germany was preparing to enter the League of
Nations, and we were preparing to welcome her, knowing lull
well that her presence at Geneva would enhance the League s
prestige and make it more effective.

Germany was ready in 1925 to accept the obligations and
duties to which we subscribed when we adhered to the Covenant ;
her policy was to be based on the same principles as ours, and
that was an important factor in our security. ,

Germany has now left the League; unfortunately, the hour
for her return has not come yet. This fact must also be taken

simple reminder of the past, this simple comparison
between 1925 and 1937, brings out the difference between the
problems facing us to-day and the problems that faced us twelve
years ago. It explains why different solutions are justified.

^ The story would, however, be incomplete if I omitted the
events of March 7th, 1936. In reoccupying the demilitarized
zone, in repudiating the Treaty of Locarno, Germany placed
France, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium m a difficult

Slt ]ta London, the three countries most directly concerned sought
means of meeting the situation. They made arrangements which
they themselves regarded as provisional. Above all— and i
think I may pay them this tribute— they never lost heart, in spite
of their very understandable bitterness and disappointment.
They set to work again without losing hope, but with the deter-
mination to aim at peace, whatever happened. .

They resumed their negotiations; they reformulated their
proposals; they tried once again to create confidence and a

spirit of understanding. .. , ae

The work they had undertaken was long and exacting , it was
arduous; it required time. I still firmly hope that one day it

W *Yet the provisional system adopted in London was particularly
burdensome for a small country. France and Great Britain
quite understood this; they both felt, with us, that the agreement
reached in March 1936 to meet a new situation that had arisen
unexpectedly should be reviewed and readjusted.

Belgium was legitimately anxious to return at once to a more
normal international status, a status better adapted to her

resources and traditions. . . .

The Prime Minister and I have often tried to explain these
ideas. The King gave new force to them in his speech of
October 14th, and public opinion has almost unanimously
approved of them.

62 APPENDIX 3

What are the principles on which our foreign policy is based ?

I should like to remind you of them again. We want first and
foremost to find a formula for uniting our people. We do not
want to make sacrifices for the sake of a specifically Walloon or
specifically Flemish ideology. We want a policy that is solely
and exclusively Belgian. We want a policy firmly rooted in our
national traditions, a policy which will help us to play our part in
Europe.

Belgium has no direct interests outside her own frontiers ; she
has no ambition other than to remain what she is; she seeks
nothing ; she asks nothing of anyone but peace. (Hear, hear !)

But — and this is both her misfortune and her greatness — she
has for centuries been a European battlefield, a highway for
invasion for all the conquerors. Her role, the role entrusted
to her, one she must fulfil, is to close up on all sides and in all
directions the way of invasion; to erect so many barriers and
create so many difficulties on the battlefield of Europe that even
the boldest are deterred.

That is why our military policy is so closely bound up with our
foreign policy. If Europe has more confidence in us to-day, it is
not only because of our loyal attitude. It is because a few
months ago, for the first time in our history, we all together
shouldered the heavy burdens demanded of us.

But apart from this we also want to contribute towards the
collective organization of peace, towards the formulation of an
international law. In spite of failure, in spite of disillusionment,
we should like to feel that one day wisdom and reason will prevail.
That is why we are faithful to the League of Nations and why we
offer it our loyal collaboration.

All this we have said over and over again. France and Great
Britain heard and understood ; in their joint declaration they
defined our foreign policy in terms not a single word of which do
I need to alter :

“ The said Governments have taken note of the views which the
Belgian Government has itself expressed concerning the interests
of Belgium, and more particularly —

“ (1) The determination expressed publicly and on more than
one occasion by the Belgian Government : (a) to defend
the frontiers of Belgium with all its forces against any
aggression or invasion, and to prevent Belgian territory
from being used, for purposes of aggression against
another State, as a passage or as a base of operations
by land, by sea, or in the air ; ( b ) to organize the defence
of Belgium in an efficient manner for this purpose ;

APPENDIX 3 63

“ (2) The renewed assurances of the fidelity ol Belgium to
the Covenant of the League of Nations and to the
obligations which it involves for Members of the
League.”

Having thus defined our foreign policy, France and Great
Britain of their own accord took a twofold decision. They re-
leased us from the guarantees we had given them in Locarno and
London, and they maintained the guarantees they had given us
That is our new position. I very sincerely believe that it
represents an improvement on which we can congratulate our-
selves. • •

Why an improvement ? Because it is simple ; because it is
clear ; because we now know exactly what our obligations are ;
because from now on there is only one ground on which we can
be forced to make war : one ground about which there can be no
discussion, no controversy; one ground about which we should
all be united and resolute— the defence of our territory against
an enemy attack. (Hear, hear !) . .

The declaration of April 24th is not a treaty in the strict sense.
It is a spontaneous act on the part of France and Great Britain,
but it is justified by the definition of our foreign policy. It
follows that if one day we use our freedom to modify our policy,
France and Great Britain will be entitled to withdraw their

guarantee. , . . ,

There can be no doubt as to these principles.

I therefore sincerely believe that everyone will admit that we
are in a stronger position to-day than we were before, since,
while we are released from some of our obligations, we retain all

° U But g tMs brings me to the possible objection of those who feel
we are being selfish, those who, in the language of international
law, affirm that we have failed to be loyal to the principles of
collective security and mutual assistance.

Frankly I do not agree. But if we are to make ourselves
heard and understood, we must break down the barrier, tear

away the screen of language, and get at the facts.

If collective security is a notion that implies that all States,
whatever their size, whatever their strength or their traditions
or their geographical situation, must adopt the same attitude, must
subscribe to the same undertakings, if it means that Belgium s
policy must be identical with the policy of France, Great Britain,
or Germany, then I say collective security is a vague ideology
which can never be of any service, for it is deeply opposed to the
facts and possibilities, (Hear, hear !) But if collective security

64 APPENDIX 3

means that to promote the common welfare of all peoples, the
organization and maintenance of peace, each State must do its
utmost to play its part in so far as its resources permit, then I
agree, and I would add that that is Belgium’s position. For
what is important is not what undertakings we give, but what
undertakings we keep. And I repeat once more that in organiz-
ing our national defences, in making a great military effort, in
not quibbling about what form aggression against us may take,
in facing the cruel risks that all this entails, Belgium is giving
Europe everything she can give, everything that Europe can
legitimately ask of her. (Hear, hear !)

That, then, is how Great Britain and France and Belgium have
settled for themselves the obligations of the past.

There remains the future.

The efforts begun during the past few months will continue.
The Franco-British Declaration makes this clear. In particular,
an immediate solution was sought and found for certain problems,
seeing that the negotiations for a Western pact may take some
time.

Belgium intends to take part in these negotiations. The
Government is well aware that the work will not be completed
until formulas have been found that are acceptable to
Germany.

I have already explained how much importance I attach to
the last declaration of the Chancellor of the German Reich. It
testified to a state of mind which we cannot but approve; it
suggests possibilities which I have no intention of abandoning.
The difficulties are not insurmountable. The state of mind with
which we approach them is a fundamental factor in success or
failure. The state of Europe is better to-day than it was six
months ago, and the Franco-British Declaration is a new
factor making for appeasement.

It is a fact that most European statesmen have a good-will
towards peace, and we must have confidence.

We have passed the first stage. I envisage the stage we are now
approaching with optimism. That is all I need say about the
Franco-British Declaration.

There remain two problems which are not dealt with in the
declaration. But I should like to say a few words about them,
for I know Belgian public opinion and European public opinion
are interested. I refer to the interpretation of Article 16 of the
Covenant and to what is known as the question of General
Staff agreements.

I shall have very little to say about Article 16, for I think it is
for the Assembly at Geneva to give an official interpretation of

APPENDIX 3 65

the texts. But in view of the present discussions, the Chamber
will expect me to express some opinion on it.

Moreover, I hope what I am going to say will help to clear up
a problem which will only become more confused and difficult
to solve if we are unduly cautious and subtle.

Here I am following the example of M. de Graeff, the honour-
able Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, who has
just made important and noteworthy declarations in the Nether-
lands Parliament.

The most important and most difficult part of Article 16 is the
paragraph before the last dealing with the right of passage : The
Members of the League of Nations “ will take the necessary steps
to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of
the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect
the covenants of the League.”

How and when would this operate ?

It is quite extraordinary— and I might almost say disquieting—
that so important a text, the application of which may produce
serious consequences, should still be left open to individual
interpretation.

As far as the Belgian Government is concerned, there are two
conditions fundamental to affording the right of passage through
our territory. The first is that on no hypothesis could passage be
afforded without the consent of Belgium. The second is that
Belgium could only give her consent in the case of joint action.

There does not seem to me to be any serious doubt as to these
two conditions.

The first is the only possible interpretation compatible with our
full sovereignty, the only interpretation compatible also with our
public law.

This is so obvious that I do not need to demonstrate it.

The second condition— that there must be joint action— follows
from the text itself. . .

I would not, of course, go so far as to maintain that joint
action means the effective participation of all the Members of the
League of Nations without exception; but it does mean, if we are
to be reasonably satisfied, that our neighbours must participate.

Those are the main ideas I hope to defend at Geneva when
the question is raised there. (Hear, hear !)

In so far as General Staff agreements are concerned, my reply
will be clear. The Franco-British Declaration of April 24th
closes for us the period that might be described as the era of
military agreements, and I am glad of it. (Hear, hear !)

Here some explanation is called for.

I am glad of it, not because these agreements were bad, but

66 APPENDIX 3

because in spite of the facts, in spite of affirmations ten times,
twenty times, repeated by all my predecessors, they lent them-
selves, both at home and in Europe, to confusion and mistrust.

To some of us they were proof of our enfeoffment to one of
our great neighbours. Others regarded them as an essential
factor in our national defence. Each view was as false as the
other.

Now these military agreements are done away with, I solemnly
repeat again that they were not political ; that they in no way
impaired our independence; and that the spirit in which they
were conceived was always the spirit in which they were applied.

That being so, where are we now ?

The merit of the Franco-British Declaration, as I have said
already— and I now repeat it— is to have clarified the situation.
For us to-day there is only one possible ground for war — national
defence.

The military problems of our responsible authorities are there-
fore now freed of any superfluous complications due to our
responsibility for guarantees.

The problem is simplified — it is a purely technical problem.

Our foreign policy is now in line with what we can do in the
military sphere.

We are free to deal quite independently with the technical
problem ; we have not agreed, and we shall never agree, to the
slightest interference, the smallest restriction.

Once again we give a formal undertaking : whatever we ought to
do to ensure the national defence, within the lines laid down above,
will be done.

That is the end of this unduly lengthy declaration. I have
nothing of importance to add to it.

The Government of national coalition and renewal has set
itself the task, with the support of your confident co-operation, of
making Belgium more prosperous, more socially developed, and
more strong.

It is convinced that in attaining to the stage of foreign policy I
have just described, it has made a useful contribution to that end.

It awaits and expects your approval. Your approval will
crown its efforts, and once again the world will have the spectacle
of a free people, magnificently confident of the destiny of the
Fatherland. (Loud applause.)

APPENDIX 4 67

Appendix 4

GERMAN DECLARATION OF OCTOBER 13TH, 1937

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour, on behalf of the German Government,
to make the following communication to your Excellency:

The German Government has taken cognizance, with particular
interest, of the public declarations in which the Belgian Govern-
ment defines the international position of Belgium. For its part,
it has repeatedly given expression, especially through the declara-
tion of the Chancellor of the German Reich in his speech of
January 30th, 1937, to its own point of view.

The German Government has also taken cognizance of the
declaration made by the British and French Governments on
April 24th, 1937.

Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty of
Locarno may still take some time, and being desirous of strength-
ening the peaceful aspirations of the two countries, the German
Government regards it as appropriate to define now its own
attitude towards Belgium.

To this end it makes the following declaration :

(1) The German Government has taken note of the views
which the Belgian Government has thought fit to express ; that
is to say :

(a) Of the policy of independence which it intends to exercise
in full sovereignty ;

(b) Of its determination to defend the frontiers of Belgium with
all its forces against any aggression or invasion, and to prevent
Belgian territory from being used, for purposes of aggression
against another State, as a passage or as a base of operations by
land, by sea, or in the air ; and to organize the defence of Belgium
in an efficient manner for this purpose.

(2) The German Government considers that the inviolability
and integrity of Belgium are common interests of the Western
Powers. It confirms its determination that in no circumstances
will it impair this inviolability and integrity, and that it will at
all times respect Belgian territory, except, of course, in the event
of Belgium’s taking part in a military action directed against
Germany in an armed conflict in which Germany is involved.

(3) The German Government, like the British and French
Governments, is prepared to assist Belgium should she be sub-
jected to an attack or to invasion.

I have the honour, etc.

68 APPENDIX 4

Acknowledgment of Receipt

The Belgian Government has taken note with great satisfaction
of the declaration communicated to it this day by the German
Government. It thanks the German Government warmly for this
communication.

Appendix 5

DECLARATION MADE BY KING LEOPOLD ON BEHALF
OF THE HEADS OF THE STATES OF THE OSLO GROUP,
AUGUST 23RD, 1939

The declaration I am about to read is made at the Palace of
Brussels before the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and on behalf
of the Heads of the States of the Oslo Group.

Theworld is passing through a period of tension which threatens
to put a stop to all normal collaboration between States. Great
Powers take measures that amount almost to the mobilization of
their armed forces. Have not the small Powers good reason to
fear that they may become the victims of a conflict into which
they might be drawn against their wills ? Although they
have indubitably followed a policy of independence and have
made no secret of their strong determination to remain neutral,
are they not open to the danger of being affected by arrangements
made without their knowledge ?

Even in the absence of hostilities, the world is threatened with
economic collapse. Distrust and suspicion are everywhere.
Under our very eyes the factions are gathering; the armies are
forming; a terrifying struggle is about to begin in Europe.
Shall our Continent destroy itself in a fearful war in which there
will be neither victor nor vanquished, a conflict that will engulf
the spiritual and material values built up through centuries of
civilization ?

The war psychosis is invading our own lands, and public
opinion, though well aware of what an unthinkable disaster a
conflagration would constitute for the whole of mankind, is
increasingly giving way to the idea that we must inevitably be
drawn into it. We must counteract this fatal mood of resigna-
tion.

Not a single people — we are absolutely convinced — would
willingly send its children to their death in order to deprive other
nations of their right of existence.

States have, of course, different interests. But are there any

appendix 5 69

interests that cannot be reconciled with one another more easily
before than after a war ?

Let the conscience of the world be roused! The worst may
still be avoided, but time presses. The course of events may very
soon render any direct contact between us even more difficult.

Let there be no mistake ! We know that the right to live must
be founded on a firm basis, and the peace that we want is peace
with respect for the rights of all nations. A durable peace can-
not be based on force. It can only be based on a moral order.

Does not wisdom command us to make a truce of this war of
words, of provocations and threats, to be ready to discuss our
problems with one another ? We solemnly urge those who hold
the future in their hands to agree to submit their disputes and
their claims to open negotiation in a spirit of brotherly co-
operation.

For that reason, on behalf of :

His Majesty the King of Denmark,

The President of the Republic of Finland,

Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg,

His Majesty the King of Norway,

Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands,

His Majesty the King of Sweden,
and on my own behalf, each of us acting with the approval of our
Governments, I make this appeal. We hope that other Heads of
States may show the same solicitude for the peace and security
of their peoples and may join their appeal to ours.

To-morrow hundreds of millions will welcome our plea that
the course of the war be arrested. May those who hold the
future of the world in their hands show themselves responsive to
these sentiments and see that their often-expressed desire to settle
their differences by peaceful means is achieved.

And may the disaster which threatens mankind be averted!

Appendix 6

DECLARATION MADE BY THE AMBASSADOR OF
GERMANY ON AUGUST 26TH, 1939

In view of the gravity of the international situation, I am expressly
instructed by the Head of the German Reich to transmit to Your
Majesty the following communication :

Though the German Government is at present doing every-
thing in its power to arrive at a peaceful solution of the questions
at issue between the Reich and Poland, it nevertheless desires to

70 appendix 6

define clearly here and now, the attitude which it proposes to
adopt towards Belgium should a conflict in Europe become

' n ?he German Government is firmly determined to abide by the
terms of the Declaration contained in the Ge^n No^of
October 13th 1937. This provides, in effect, that uermany
wSt no cL’umstances impair the inriotabUity and >£egr,tyof
Belgium and will at all times respect Belgian territory, tne
German Government renews this undertaking however in the
expiation that the Belgian Government for its pa£ vnU
observe an attitude of strict neutrality and that Belgium wm
tolerate no violation on the part of a third Power, but that o
contory “he will oppose it with all the force at her disposal It
goe wfthout saying that if the Belgian Government were o
fdont a different attitude, the German Government would
naturally be compelled to defend its interests in conformity with
the new situation thus created.

Appendix 7

DECLARATION MADE ^

GREAT BRITAIN ON AUGUST 271 ti,

His Maiesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have neglected
m stens which might contribute to the maintenance of peace
Should these efforts fail, they know that Belgium will scrupulously

feffWawassraSfrsS

DECLARATION MADE BY THE ^BASSADOR OF
FRANCE ON AUGUST 28TH,

French Embassy in Belgium,

Brussels, August 28 th, 1939.

THE Government of the Republic have neglected steps which
might contribute to the maintenance of peace. Should these

Ambassade de France
en Belgique

Bruxelles. le 28 Aoftt 1939*

Le Gouvemement de la R6publique n a rien n4g g
de CB qui pout contribuer au ma tat Ion de ta paix. Si ses
efforts venaient a tahouer, il salt qua le Gouvemement
Beige aaurait ae conformer emctement a aes obligations
intemationales .

Dane le caa ob la Belgique adopter-ait une position
de neutrality le Gouvemement Franjata resteralt, blen
entenau, comme en 1914, rtaolu a respecter pleinement cette
neutrality Ce n-est qutau =as ob la neutrality Beige ne
serait pas respectta par une autre Puissance que la France,
pour assurer sa propre defense, pourreit Hr. amenta a mo-
difier son attitude.

Los engagements d-assistance quo le Gouvemement
franqaie a pris envers la Belgique et qui out H4 -pres-
ent maintenus dana sa communication au Gouvemement
beige du 24 Avril 1937 conservent natureluement eur P
ue valour./ •

c- “■ * ““-’s.risS.’ur"’

71

72 APPENDIX 7

efforts fail, they know that Belgium will scrupulously abide by
her international obligations. If Belgium adopts an attitude of
neutrality, the French Government will, of course, as in 1914,
be resolute to respect this neutrality fully. Only in the event of
Belgian neutrality not being respected by another power would
France be led to modify its attitude in order to ensure its own
defence. The undertakings of assistance which the French
Government has entered into towards Belgium, and which were
expressly maintained in the communication to the Belgian
Government of April 24th, 1937, naturally retain their full effect.

Appendix 8

DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY
September 3rd, 1939

The Belgian Government declares that it is firmly determined to
maintain its neutrality in the conflict which has just broken out
in Europe. Consequently, the following rules will immediately
be put into operation :

I

No hostile act shall be permitted and no base for hostile
operations shall be established within the limits of the jurisdiction
of the State, including the territory of the Kingdom in Europe
and the Colonies and Possessions under mandate, the territorial
sea and the air space over such territory and territorial sea.

Territorial sea shall be understood to mean the sea round the
coast to a breadth of three nautical miles, at the rate of 60 per
degree of latitude, measured from the low-water line.

II

It shall not be permitted :

1. For any part of the territory whatsoever to be occupied by
a belligerent military force;

2. For troops or convoys of munitions or war supplies to enter
or pass through this territory by land ;

3. For belligerent warships or similar vessels to enter or pass
through the territorial sea ;

4. For belligerent military aircraft or similar aircraft to enter
or traverse the territory, territorial sea or air space over such
territory or territorial sea within the jurisdiction of the State.

APPENDIX 8 73

III

Merchant vessels armed for defence may enter and remain
in ports and roadsteads after complying with the prescriptions
enacted by the local authorities in the interests of security. The
number of such vessels in each port or roadstead, however, may
not exceed the maximum laid down by the local authorities in
the interests of the security of the country.

Vessels carrying not more than two guns of a calibre of over
8 cm. and under 16 cm. and a crew not appreciably larger in
effectives than is required for commercial operations shall be
regarded as armed for defence.

IV

Troops or soldiers forming part of a belligerent force who
may come within the jurisdiction of the State shall be disarmed
andintemed.

Warships or similar vessels belonging to the belligerents which
shall infringe the provisions of Article 2 or Article 7 shall be
seized, and their crews and any military passengers shall be
interned. . .

Military aircraft or similar aircraft belonging to the belligerents
which shall enter the jurisdiction of the State shall be seized and
their crews shall be interned. Such aircraft shall be forced to
land or to alight should they fail to do so of their own accord.

Aircraft on board a warship or similar vessel shall be deemed
to form part of the latter, provided that while the vessel remains
within the jurisdiction of the State they remain on board.

V

Notwithstanding Article 4, the following shall not be interned :

(a) Shipwrecked persons, or persons who are sick or wounded,
provided they have not taken part in hostile acts within the
jurisdiction of the State ;

(b) Soldiers on board a merchant vessel not ranking as a
warship, which is merely calling at a port or roadstead ;

(c) Escaped prisoners of war ;

(6?) Deserters.

VI

The provisions of Articles 2 and 4 shall not apply to :

(1) A belligerent warship or other similar vessel which is able
to prove that by reason of damage sustained or the condition of

74 APPENDIX 8

the sea, it is compelled to enter a port or roadstead of the State,
provided that it shall not be pursued by the enemy.

A vessel may only repair damage in so far as this is essential
to safe navigation, and it may not in any manner whatsoever
increase its military strength.

It shall leave the said port or roadstead as soon as the circum-
stances which caused it to take refuge there shall have ceased
to exist. The Government may fix a time-limit after which the
vessel may be seized and the crew and military passengers interned.
Members of the crew and military passengers who remain on land
after the vessel has left shall be interned.

(2) Warships and similar vessels which are able to prove that
they entered the jurisdiction of the State owing to force majeure
and in spite of having taken every precautionary measure to
avoid it.

(3) Warships, aircraft, or similar vessels and machines which
are employed solely for religious, scientific, or philanthropic
missions.

VII

A belligerent warship or similar vessel which may find itself
in a port or roadstead, or even in territorial waters, when war
breaks out, shall leave within a time-limit laid down by the local
authorities.

Belligerent aircraft or similar aircraft within the jurisdiction of
the State on the publication of the Declaration of Neutrality shall
be interned.

VIII

In the cases provided for under Articles 6 and 7, if warships
or similar vessels belonging to the two belligerent parties should
find themselves simultaneously in close proximity to one another,
at least twenty-four hours shall elapse between the departure of
the vessel of one belligerent and the departure of the vessel of
the other belligerent.

Vessels shall leave in the order in which they arrived, except
in special circumstances.

A belligerent warship may not leave a port or roadstead until
at least twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant
vessel flying the flag of its enemy.

IX

Warships or similar vessels covered by Article 7 shall only be
permitted to revictual in ports and roadsteads for the purpose of
replenishing their normal peace-time stores of food and water.

APPENDIX 8 75

Similarly, such vessels may only take on fuel to enable them to
reach the nearest port in their own or allied country.

Warships or similar vessels covered by Article 6 (1) may
replenish their stores of food, water, and fuel in so far as this is
necessary for their requirements during their stay.

X

Prizes may not be taken into waters subject to the jurisdiction
of the State.

Should a prize be taken into the said waters, it shall be released,
together with its crew.

The crew placed on board by the captor shall be interned,
provided that the prize was not brought in owing to damage or
to the bad condition of the sea.

XI

Any war material washed ashore or found in the sea and
subsequently brought to land shall be seized unless it is necessary
to destroy it in the interests of public safety.

XII

Combatant corps may not be formed or enlistment offices
opened in the territory of the State for the benefit of the belli-
gerents.

XIII

It shall be prohibited, within the jurisdiction of the State, to
take service on board belligerent warships or similar vessels.

It shall be prohibited, within the jurisdiction of the State, to
fit out, arm or equip vessels intended to assist in hostile operations
against a belligerent, or to supply or conduct such vessels to a
belligerent. .... „ , _

It shall be prohibited, within the jurisdiction of the State, to
supply arms or ammunition to warships or similar vessels be-
longing to a belligerent or to assist them to augment their fighting
strength.

XIV

It shall be prohibited, within the jurisdiction of the State, to
repair warships or similar vessels belonging to a belligerent or
to supply them with materials for repairs, tools, supplies, water,
or fuel, unless permission has been obtained beforehand from
the competent local authorities.

76

appendix 8
XV

i Tt shall be prohibited to form supplies of arms, ammunition,
l : r emirs fuel and any articles useful for the conduct

^ “e ^jec? of seeking an opportunity to hand
hem oven’o the maritime forces of a belligerent in close proximity

0 7 th ' SimUariTit shall be prohibited to convey arms, ammunition,
renairs fuel or any article useful for the conduct
oflhe war directly out of the territory to belligerent vessels near
the coast.

XVI

i Aircraft shall not be permitted to leave if it is either in a

SSEi-sSE

feSSSSse-

b t StepSited to execute on an aircraft any work intended

wWchcOTmmthin th e jurisdiction of the State after the declaration
of war, with the permission of the Government.

XVII

It shall Pi^^^ai^^whatsMVCTfo°Mria/obsemti'ons

*SSSsseBsMt«s:

belligerent.

XVIII

Tt shall be prohibited, within the jurisdiction of the State, for
a bell^erent Power or persons in his service .to mstaU or operate
wireless stations or other means of commumcation.

XIX

i Tt shall be prohibited, within the jurisdiction of the State,
touse wkeless stations for transmitting information relating to
the^ilitaryforces of the belligerents or to military operations
in a belligerent country.

77

appendix 8

2 . Wl.hin
information.

The Government draws Liv^ricriy^wit^tlm above rules
population to its d "f XchTould St be t ™ch lt as \o compromise
the neutrality and interests of the country.

Appendix 9

ORDER OF ™E s D« OJ k THEK..NO TO THE ARMY,

“ To-day I take over the "show by its valour

StSifice rirTtit is worthy of the confidence which the
whole nation places in it.

Appendix 10

sreech by th^ f ■*. 1 ° SW vmm

It is a great honour to me to be speakmj &Tthe FOTMt^nvite-
SstSSo the American nation with great

^ fellow-countrymen, the U^tS^States^Not

precious and very friendly effectively and sympatheti-

one Belgian can have forgo Belgian people by directing

cally the American people he' toed B^an p

I regard the S subject proposed an appeal for the defence of

civilization-as a tridu ^/° ^ve had in mind that the Belgians
Those who suggested it ’ wil 11 hi iw e 1 history of the western

“i’Sd’iSc" » .... .f a..

centre’s for the '^fending civilization by

I am convinced that my , ^ European conflict, and

can coS myself to describing it to my American

78

appendix 10

listeners. It is an attitude that is in complete harmony with
the desires the courage, and the honour of my people.

As Head of the State, I am happy to have an opportunity of
placing the following facts on record. . i f

P In 1937 Belgium proclaimed her independence, and each of
her three great neighbours took note of her declaration Indeed,
they went further— they gave us, of their own accord, formal
assurances that they would respect our terntory and would
marantee the independence of Belgium. The declaration of
neutrality by the Belgian Government at the beginning of the
war was the logical conclusion of this policy.

Neutrality is, moreover, quite in keeping with the traditions
and aspirations of the Belgian people whose sentiments and
attitude of mind were forged during age-long struggles. Belgians,
who possess the most acute sense of individual hberty have paid

for their institutions at the cost of their own blood and by their
steadfast determination to remain themselves.

Neutrality is also vital to my country’s interests. Belgium i
a small territory but one of the most densely populated m the
world and she depends mainly for her existence on the labour
of her people; and this, in its turn, depends on the maintenance
of our export trade and on the free flow of our industrial suppli

an So 0l for°the Belgian people, peace is a matter of life or death.

We have no territorial ambitions whatsoever. Nor have we
had anything to do with the origin of the European conflict,

either directly or indirectly. . . . , tprr5torv

But if Belgium were to become involved in it, her teirit y
would be turned into a battleground; and because her area is so
small, that would mean total destruction, whatever might be the

0U Be°lgium!' side beside with Holland, stands, in the interests of

al pi a a S ced P aUhe U LTsTroads of the boundaries of western Europe,
Belgium — neutral and loyal-and strong, as she is to-day—
fulfils a fundamentally peaceful mission; she sets limits to th
battlefield- she wards off family bereavement. Together with
the other neutral States she constitutes a citadel of peace; she is
a factor making for that spirit of ^conciliation which l done can
save our civilization from the abyss into which general war

W °We arequitfclear as to our duties and our rights; we await
the future calmly and steadfastly, with a clear conscience. We
are ready to ensure with all our force that our independence is
respected.

79

appendix 10

he lt up u 7 P U bVattacked-and may God preserve us front such

to us in 1937 and renewed on the eve ot me an(J thU

without any would be behind the Army,

time once again the whoie coun y ^ t0 res pect

But we cannot believe that fte belb .gerents win

our neutrality We have “““'Xir mrn can have confidence
before always be true
To that loyalty, as sovereigr i of a free nation to
May I venture to aspirations and

whom we feel very near because r ^ sustain us our

efforts^ promote'the'cause of peace in the service of civilization.
Appendix 11

TELEGRAM FR^Q^I^^LHEL^NA AND^KIN^

LEOPOLD TO THE HEADS OP ^ BRITAIN,

germanv, da FRANCE V em AND 7t GRE 939

In this hour °t^ r t “ S b ^ e r a k ^taEuro^’, ^fed convinced

declared, a short time ago that they wouw d^p ^
examine the reasonable an ^ present circum-

We feel that it would bed.fficultfor diem, in the p^ tQ

stances, to get into touch wi are therefore ready, as

and reconcile their points of v . W terms with

sovereigns of two h^l State h " good offices. If this

psrKffKffiwssa. 4, - «.

factors likely to make for agreemen^ ^ haye tQ fulfil for the

fetrtqfwffl be made towards^t^estaMshwnt of laatog peace.

The Hague, November 1 th .

80 APPENDIX 12

Appendix 12

SPEECH IN THE CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES
BY M. SPAAK, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON
DECEMBER 19TH, 1939

M. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade . — I
should be wanting in gratitude and a sense of justice if, at the
beginning of this speech, I did not thank the leaders of groups for
the words they have spoken and the sentiments they have
expressed.

In the difficult times which are undoubtedly still ahead of us,
there could be no more hopeful sign that we shall overcome our
difficulties than our unity on foreign policy, a unity from which
a people like ours derives its greatest strength.

M. Delwaide, M. Huysmans, and M. Hymans have made my
task easy. They have, I feel sure, interpreted the views of the
vast majority of the people of this country who approve the
Government’s foreign policy.

Let it suffice then to repeat here with emphasis that “ Belgium
is neutral and intends to remain neutral as long as her indepen-
dence, the integrity of her territory, and her vital interests are
not threatened.”

In this Belgium is within her rights, and I would add that she
is doing her duty to herself.

There is, then, no difference of opinion as to principles. Not
one Belgian in a thousand would ask or would desire that we
should take part in the war that is rending Europe unless implac-
able necessity compels us to do so.

That being so, I have no need to explain or justify once more
our country’s attitude; and I should much prefer to confine
myself to emphasizing that public opinion is almost unanimous.

Why then do I offer you explanations ?

Because I feel you ought to know the Government’s views on
one or two points.

I will enumerate them in the order in which I want to deal with
them: (1) Rights and duties of neutrality; (2) Offer of good
offices of November 7th and our relations with the Netherlands ;
(3) Russo-Finnish conflict.

The Government has been accused of taking too narrow, petty
and, as it were, pusillanimous a view of neutrality.

This criticism seems to me to be quite undeserved. The
Government is, indeed, very conscious of the difficulties facing it,
of its responsibilities. It is undoubtedly in a better position than
anyone else to weigh up the dangers we are running and the odds

appendix 12

81

we are up against. It is not surprising, therefore, that its reac-
tions should differ from the reactions of those whose hearts rule
their heads. But no one in the Government has ever maintained
that neutrality should force us to condone injustice, to remain
silent before the cruelties of war. No one has ever maintained
that a neutral Belgian must be an indifferent Belgian. And the
history of to-day cannot efface the history of yesterday. Such
truths have often been proclaimed, and not a member of the
Government would deny them. But has not the time come for
me to repeat once more — at the risk of boring you — the words of
J. Bainville, whose wisdom and profundity I appreciate the more
as my experience widens: “ You must will the consequences of

what you want ” ? . , . , .

The fact that the Belgian State is neutral with the consent-
nay more, with the approval— of the vast majority of Belgians,
imposes on it certain duties, particularly the duty of loyalty to
the belligerents— duties hallowed by tradition. It also entitles
the Government to urge that in expressing our views we should
cultivate a sense of balance, a sense of proportion and dignity.
Quite apart from any legal controversy as to the meaning of neu-
trality can you not see that life would soon become impossible,
in practice, and that neutrality itself would be singularly com-
promised, if the neutral State maintained normal relations with
all the belligerents, while at the same time its citizens, letting their
sense of friendship and their feelings run away with them, lost all
sense of proportion and gave free rein to both their sympathies

and their antipathies ? . , ...

I repeat that to-day personal liberty must be squared with
national discipline, and that to sacrifice exaggerated utterances
is a very small contribution if it helps to strengthen our

P Thasten to add that fortunately the situation has greatly im-
proved. The daily Press, in particular, has made a praiseworthy
effort and the moderation with which it supports certain views
does not in any way detract — far from it — from their influence.

The almost irreproachable discussions in this Chamber also
show that we can be neutral without in any way giving up our
intellectual independence; neutral, as we wish to be, without
weakness, but also without giving any provocation.

On Tuesday, November 7th, the Queen of the Netherlands
and the King of the Belgians again made a united appeal to the
belligerents, offering their good offices in seeking reasonable
and sound bases for an equitable peace.” Everyone understood,
everybody in Belgium approved, the King s action.

M. Carton de Wiart points out in his report that my presence

82 APPENDIX 12

at The Hague was a sure sign that the step taken by our Sovereign
was strictly constitutional.

May I say that in the circumstances I am not content with
constitutional correctness. I feel I should thank the King in
public for the magnificent efforts he has made for several years to
spare our country the horrors of war (loud applause); for the
wise advice he has always given to the various Governments that
came into power one after another; for the strength of mind with
which he fulfils his very heavy task; for the example he has
always set those with whom he comes into contact, an example
which compels respect, admiration, and affection. (Hear, hear.)

Only those who are unwilling to understand can have had any
hesitation as to the significance of the appeal of the two Sovereigns
and can have attributed to them mysterious motives or aims.

After appealing in very clear terms to the belligerents, offering
their good offices, the Queen and King said : This would seem to
us to be our mission, a mission we have to fulfil for the good of
our own people and in the interests of the whole world.

The good of our people and the interests of the whole world :
those two ideals the Sovereigns and their Governments do not
dissociate. In seeking to establish reasonable and sound bases
for an equitable peace, they intend to devote themselves to this
stirring task.

That their words were not heard, that we must assume that it is
still too soon and that the hour of peace has not yet struck, I
cannot but record with regret, with emotion, with some anxiety,
too. And I hope that later on no one will have cause to regret
the failure of this effort.

The common effort of the Sovereigns and their Governments
provided an opportunity, as the official communique of November
7th pointed out, to reaffirm the solidarity of interests of the
Netherlands and Belgium.

It has recently been stressed in this Chamber and elsewhere by
several speakers ; it is sincerely appreciated throughout the whole
country.

It is a fact — one of the plainest facts — the most obvious facts —
of the present day ; and I find it difficult, I must say, to under-
stand why some people close their eyes to it on the misleading
pretext that they and they alone defended it here some years ago.

For my part, I have no hesitation in saying that from the
military as well as the economic and moral point of view, an
independent and neutral Holland is of vital importance to Belgium.

I do not think it necessary to labour so obvious a truth.

I am even more anxious than I was — what has happened makes
it necessary — that there should be nothing mechanical about

appendix 12 83

Belgian foreign policy. I want to be quite free to form a judg-
ment in the light of all the facts. For that reason, I think it
would be unwise to decide now what attitude we shall have to
adopt if the situation in Holland changes. But I should like to
make it clear that it would be madness to suppose such an event
would leave us indifferent. (Loud applause.)

As far as I am concerned— and I am sure I am speaking for the
whole Government— I am deeply conscious of the ties between
Belgium and the Netherlands. (Hear, hear.)

The Government is indignant at the Soviet aggression against
Finland. (Loud applause from most Parties.)

M. Lahaut. — Long live the Soviets! (Vehement protests from
most benches.) Down with the capitalist war!

The President. — Order, please, M. Lahaut.

M. Relecom. — You did not say that, M. Spaak, about
Czechoslovakia and Poland! (Lively interruptions from most
benches. Uproar.)

M. Delattre. — Long live Finland!

M. Relecom.— Yes, long live the Finnish people!

The President.— I would ask the Communist members to
stop making doubtful comments. (Applause from most
benches.) .

M. Delattre. — Long live the Finnish children, who are being
pitilessly massacred! (Several members intervened. The Presi-
dent struck the table with his mallet.)

The President. — The Minister for Foreign Affairs has the
floor and no one else.

M. Relecom— The Minister for Foreign Affairs has gone too
far.

M. Bohy. — You have gone too far yourself by supporting a
foreign Government. . „

M. Lahaut.— It is an imperialist war. I am against all
imperialism. I am against Italy ; I am against Germany. (Vio-
lent interruptions.)

The President. — Order, please, M. Lahaut.

M. Lahaut.— I don’t care. (Loud protests.)

The President.— Does the Chamber desire it to be recorded in
the verbatim report of the meeting that I have just called M.
Lahaut to order ? (Yes! Yes!)

This proposal was put to the vote and was adopted by rising
or remaining seated.

M. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade.— ■
These interruptions only serve to emphasize that there is unani-
mity in the Chamber and throughout the country. (Hear,
hear.)

84 APPENDIX 12

We cannot keep silent when an innocent little country is
attacked and allow it to be assumed from our silence that we
think the attack is justified and even normal.

Even small countries are entitled to live. They too are centres
of culture, of civilization, of social progress. And when, like
Finland during the past few years, they have carefully avoided
diplomatic intrigue, simply affirming their desire to live free and
independent among their powerful neighbours, they are entitled
to our sympathy in their misfortune. (Loud applause.)

M. Seghers (in Flemish). — Hear, hear!

M. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade . —
When, like Finland, they fight one to ten or twenty they also
have a right to our admiration. (Hear, hear.)

In its misfortune, the Finnish Government turned to the
League of Nations. What could they hope for from this appeal
to law when law was daily broken ?

Did they still believe in collective security ? I doubt it, and I
can assure you that I heard of this step with a pang.

Was I wrong ? I do not want to judge other people. I know
what very complicated and dangerous situations can arise.
All I want is to justify Belgium’s attitude.

The Soviet Union, a Member of the League of Nations— and
what a Member! — attacked Finland, another Member of the
League. The Soviet Union refused to attend to explain the
matter, and contemptuously— I might almost say cynically-
refused every proposal for an understanding, preferring force to
any form of conciliation.

The Argentine Republic proposed that the Soviet Union be
suspended from the League. I did not feel the Belgian Govern-
ment could have the slightest hesitation. Consequently it voted
in the Council of the League for the suspension of the Soviet
Union.

No one asked me for any explanation whatever, for everyone
approved. (Hear, hear.)

We know that this gesture had only moral significance. We
know that it did not give effective help to Finland.

It is very difficult for little countries, at a distance from one
another, to testify to their feeling of fellowship. We are power-
less before this tragedy, but we are ready to collaborate in any
humanitarian work that may serve, however slightly, to alleviate
the sufferings of an heroic people. (Interruptions from the
Communists.)

APPENDIX 13 85

Appendix 13

SECRET INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMANDER OF
THE 2ND LUFTFLOTTE FOUND IN A GERMAN
AEROPLANE ON JANUARY 10TH, 1940

The following documents were in possession of a Staff Major
of the 7th Air Division (parachutist and transport of troops by
air — Headquarters at Berlin) who made a forced landing in
Belgium on January 10th, 1940. The Major had been attached
to Unit 220 of Troop Transport by Air (F1.F.220), and, when
captured, was flying to Cologne to discuss the scheme at the 22nd
Infantry Division headquarters. Our Intelligence had ascertained
the 22nd Division as specially trained for landing from the air in
enemy territory.

DOCUMENT I

Air Force Command Instructions, 2

File of 17/1 1 /39 to be destroyed (?)

pp. the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force
The Chief of Staff
by order

(signature undecipherable)
Lieutenant-Colonel , General Staff.

Copy

TO: No,

IV Aviation Corps 1

VIII Aviation Corps 2

7 Aviation Division . . . . . . . . • • • • 3

Commander of Air Carrier No. 220 and to 22nd Infantry

Division . . . . . . . • • • • • • • 4

II Anti-Aircraft Defence Corps . . . . . . . . 5

Headquarters of VI Air Region 6

Headquarters of XI Air Region 7

Reconnaissance Group No. 122 . . . . . . . . 8

For the information of:

G.H.Q. of Air Force 9

B Group of Armies 10

Also to the Air Command 11

Liaison Officers at B Group of Armies 12

Army Headquarters, No. 6 13

86 APPENDIX 13

Air Force Command 14

Staff:

Staff-Commander .. .. .. .. .. ..15

Chief of Staff 16

Deputy Chief of Staff . . . . 17

Intelligence Section .. .. .. .. .. 18

Operations Section, No. 2 19

A.Q 20

Officer in Charge of Signals . . . . . . . . 21

Operations Section, No. 1 . . . . . . 22

Reserve 23 & 24

British Army here (?)

between Douai and Calais. Behind the whole of this zone
important operative reserves are held deep in Northern France.

The Belgian Army covers the Liege-Antwerp line with its main
force, lighter forces are in position in front on the Meuse-Scheldt
Canal and on the frontier.

Only light forces of the Dutch Army are in position south of
the Waal.

For weather conditions and information about the enemy : see
Ic 1 No. 7212/39 Chief of General Staff of 3/11/39.

3. The German Western Army directs its attack between the
North Sea and the Moselle, with the strongest possible air-force
support, through the Belgo-Luxemburg region, with the object

of

the largest possible groups of the French Army and of its

The fortress of Li6ge and

surrounded (?)

Further, it is intended, with the help of part of the force (10th
Army Corps reinforced by 1 Cavalry Division), to seize Dutch
territory, with the exception of Festung Holland.

5. Composition of Army Group B: see Appendix 2.

6. Co-operating Forces:

(i a ) The 3rd Luftflotte attacks, with all the weight of its aircraft,
the French Air Force on the ground, and prevents it from taking
part in land operations.

Later, it prevents the advance of the French Armies moving
north-east from their concentration areas.

The 3rd Luftflotte co-operates also with its Northern Wing
(1st Aviation Corps) with Army Group B.

( b ) The X Aviation Corps, directly under orders from Air
Force Headquarters, operates in close co-operation with the

appendix 13 87

naval forces and the F.d., Luft against the enemy naval forces and,
in particular, against the British naval forces.

its reserves and *. ' ’ Y ' ’ V-* ‘p

With regard to home defence against air attack, the cruel
object is to protect the ground and war industries organizations.

8. Forces. — Disposition of the troops and points to be attacked
— see Appendix 1.

9. Reconnaissance. -

(a) Air General Headquarters : reconnaissance to the west ot
the line Le Havre-Orl6ans-Bourges-Lyon-Geneva.

(b) 2nd Luftflottes : reconnaissance by Reconnaissance Group
122 to the north-west and west of the line Western Frisian Isles-
Amsterdam-Antwerp-Brussels-Nivelles (islands and towns in-
cluded).

Task . . T

(a) Find out the disposition of the enemy Air Force in North-
ern France and Belgium.

( b ) Watch the areas where the British Army is concentrated,
detect as quickly as possible any movements from that area
towards Belgium in the direction of Brussels-Ghent.

Left boundary

Li&ge-Charleroi-Valenciennes-Amiens-Dieppe.

(these towns included)

(/) Crossing of the frontier by reconnaissance planes first on
the day A at H plus 5 minutes.

10. Task of the VIII Aviation Corps:

On the first day of the attack, the VIII Aviation Corps supports
with part of its forces a landing operation of the VII Aviation
Division (see special order).

Closely co-operating with the 6th Army (mam action to the
west of Maastricht), it supports the advance of the land forces
attacking the fortified line and the streams of the basin of the
Meuse and destroys the Belgian Army to the west of that region.
Attacks against towns and villages during the course of these
operations are only permitted if it is absolutely certain that they
are occupied by troops.

Its fighter squadrons have to obtain command ot the air over
the area of attack of the 6th Army.

7

88 APPENDIX 13

DOCUMENT 2
Appreciation of the Situation

1. Terrain.

On either side of the Meuse a high plateau with heights rising
to .... m. Very uneven, in places great differences in height,
ravines.

Clayey ground, medium heavy to heavy. Only sparsely (?)
populated. The operational area of the Division is on the whole
thickly wooded.

The Meuse itself constitutes a marked cleft, deeply cut out.
Width of river 100 m. Banks rising steeply and mainly wooded.
Observation very difficult.

Parachute troops can be dropped everywhere in .... the
bridges.

Air-borne troops can only be landed at points 15 km. west of
the Meuse on the line Vitrival, M. . . ., Posee.

The country is similar in many respects to that of Freuden . . .
and troop movements ... not very mobile will be hindered. On
the other hand, it lends itself to defence by groups . . . widely
separated.

2. Landing Grounds.

Five landing grounds have been reconnoitred. Of these, three
are suitable in mild weather (I, III, V), two are suitable only
under certain conditions (II, IV). In frosty weather all are

suitable. On the whole some 30 per cent, bad landing

conditions as for “ Enterprise ” (?).

The whole of the landing troops of the division can be engaged.

Time required : Parachuting and landing of the 1st (?) Division.

A slight frost gives most favourable conditions

reducing as much as possible the jump

troops.

3 . At the cutting of the Meuse, the Division should

(objective) and keep open

Road-bridge of Annevoie.

Road bridge Yvoir (here point of main action).

Bridge Dinant-Namur (north-west )

4. If the country between the Meuse and the French frontier

up to should not be occupied by enemy troops, the

landing would at first be unopposed. The landing grounds to
the north can, it is true, be shelled by the heavy guns at Namur
(15 km.) if they should be discovered.

However, enemy attacks from the fortress of Namur must be
expected very soon, and also perhaps from Charleroi, Philippe-
ville, and Givet.

CV.efsacV.e vos IT- 11 ’

IV r dnr

#

zwieeher. Douai and

der Tiefe des nordfranz ■ aiochen Gefcietes stwrite

Reserven.

Baa belgische Heer deckt nit Kaase die Linie LUttich -
, rp en, schwuchere Krafte an den Maaa-Scnelde-K*r.al and
die Grenze vorgea-U.oben.

Vom holl&ndischer. Heer sind aiidlich des Waal nur
Kraft e sur Sicherung singe aetzt .

Luftlage und Feindbeurteilung la einzelner. siehe I e 1
Hr. 7212/39 g.Kdos.Chefsaehe vom 3 . 11 . 1939 *

a-.t-ch. '..B*heer fuhrt ..in. Offensive e.i.ohen UV
nit stairkater Untsratiiteung dureh di<o
durcn den bVigiach-l^eraburgiechen Kuum mit dec. Zw**V
ichst Starke Tall* dea franzdaiachen Heeree -and

Copy of Secret Instructions of the German Command

Facing p . 88]

n Muar und franz.Grente *>**

W ird Landung aunUcnst un^e<
kttnnen alleidinga durcl
(15 Km) gcfaast warden, f&l-

L1 it folndlr AngrUfen aue F<
hirl roi, aua philippeville

lUi-nur

; n ,3 stftrkcr<

little Mrube-ige

—

Bald nr

Llr.lt ^

, a .if otraBe ...car - Charleroi (beaoftdWj

b) ouf StraSc Maato.,.1^ - Beaumont - P««j

c) Strafle Philipi^ville - Givct, J

cl) straDo Fourm a - Chioay - Couvin - ^
. ) Litraflt- Kocrcl - Mariembourg - i'niliMj

Florcnnos, .JImH

1 ) . t .r " Fumay ~

-rs .

-■■ 3 -jjm

Copy of Secret Instructions of the German Command

appendix 13

The chief threat

advance units can te on the spot m a j^Jthe^nning of the
5. This is why

landing operation, large forces o] ou

enemy concentrations on the line Maubeuge-H,

—against troops ^ tran^rt »ovmg^^ A^^nt) ;

(6) on the road Maubw^-Beaumont-PliilipP ev *^ e (specially

(d) road FovMtesr-^toar^Cowdnj-^^U ^

(specially important), (important);

( g ) railway Mons-Charlerot 1

(h) railway Maubeuge (specially important);

(i) railway Charleroi • l s P ec “ y

(k) railway PQ TJ as ti’e r e :

(m) f Them for the protection of the Division

road Marche-Leignon-Ach

tr:L C whlX^y our own aircraft is forbidden is

^°roadf Rmere-Florette to ^^j^g^Fiorennes, ^p to "road
raUway (?) Chatelet through Gerpmne , e the forbidden

Philippeville-Dinant (this ral ™| , crossing up to Hermeton

“straight (?) up to the Anseremme
SrilgfS^ed in the zone)-line 4 km. east of

U r e uTand ^ntovenents df ^‘frontier towafte
south of Liege-at n^t ^es to th. shortest route m
Meuse, through MalinMy-Ciney, y

“iTihe^weather conditions, any detour would only cause

90

APPENDIX 13

APPENDIX 13

A

groups also stationed more to the west fly, on their way to the
front, near

The intervention of the Division with more than 600 tons of
transport planes and at this spot where the effect will be most felt
by the enemy decides the chief point of concentration of enemy
aircraft.

The Division is threatened more from the air than from the
ground. This is why strong heavy fighter and fighter aircraft
formations are necessary :

(a) for the transport, the parachuting and finally the landing

( very strong protection) ;

(b) for supplies ;

(c) against enemy air attacks (continuously and not

only according to special orders).

In this case this protection should be incessant

movement and landing. Greater needs in heavy fighters and

.... G. . . .

To satisfy this need. fighting area should only be

110 km. from the frontier (?) and should only imply

200 km. flight over enemy territory

DOCUMENT 3

Namur and the immediate vicinity (21

Art.) and light forces Ard between Ourthe (here point

of main attack) ( point) and the Meuse 2

Cavalry Divisions.

At Charleroi 3rd Regiment of Gendarmerie.

French Forces are concentrated on the frontier

ready to march (to the west of the Meuse)

Army and parts of the 2nd Army with mechanized cavalry and
infantry Divisions. Forward elements in the Givet wedge. To
the east of the Meuse positions are in the course of construction
along the railway line Namur-Assesse-Ciney-Jemelle.

2. The Meuse itself is only defended by light forces stationed
at the bridges. On the Meuse between Namur and the frontier
no permanent fortifications. Special preparations for demolition
and blocking are not known here, but are likely.

The region between the Meuse and the French frontier to the
west and to the south-west is entirely free from enemy troops.

3. It must be expected that the hostile Walloon population will

91

wage guerrilla warfare (sharp-shooting from the houses and
hedges).

4. The possibility of requisitioning (in order to enable I In-
troops to move rapidly and to keep supplied) should only be
considered with reservations owing to the sparsely populated
nature of the region.

5. Defence against enemy aircraft in the area of operations of
the 1th Air Division (FI. Div. 7).

In the operational area Namur-Dinant — and in the neigh-
bouring region no fighters nor anti-aircraft defence have been
detected so far.

Anti-aircraft guns assumed at Charleroi.

Fighters.

At St. Hubert — 1 squadron of single-seaters, only at intervals.

Liege — 1 group of single-seaters.

Nivelles — 1 group of single-seaters.

Besides important concentrations of French fighters in Ra
Verdun.

Grandmenil (33 km. west St. Vith) at intervals.

North of Huy, light anti-aircraft guns.

At St. Hubert, heavy anti-aircraft guns at intervals.

(s) Student.

This copy certified correct.

Puttner (?)

Major , General Staff.

Appendix 14

SPEECH IN THE SENATE BY M. SPAAK, MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON APRIL 16TH, 1940

M. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade . — 1
feel sure the Senate will understand that I should like to make a
short statement at the beginning of this debate.

For nearly eight months, Western Europe has been under arms.
Millions of men mount guard round our frontiers and challenge
one another.

Ten days ago two nations, two friendly nations, were drawn
into the turmoil.

We are following Norway’s efforts all the more sympathetically,
in that she was always a great lover of peace and was loyally
neutral. (Hear, hear.) (Applause from all parties.)

92 APPENDIX 14

She was therefore in much the same position as ourselves.
Her sentiments were our sentiments.

This country had enriched our European civilization by its
labour, by its social legislation, by the sum of progress it repre-
sents ; and in many ways we liked to think of it as a model.

Some of us might have had doubts as to its warlike qualities.

What strikes me most in Norway’s heroic stand is that love
of peace, respect for neutrality, the often-repeated desire to spare
one’s country the horrors of war do not in any way diminish but
rather heighten fierce determination to defend the soil of the
Fatherland when it becomes necessary. (Loud applause from
all parties.)

To other countries Norway’s attitude will be a lesson and an
example. This war, which is spreading, this war which is affect-
ing the most innocent, this war which strikes at those who least
deserve it, forces us to consider our own position, to consider
what we have done — in a word, to take our ov/n bearings.

I, like all of you no doubt, have often thought during the past
few months about our foreign policy during the past five years.

Once again the other evening I reread the different diplomatic
documents concerning Belgium and the declarations accompany-
ing them.

And once again I arrived at the reassuring conviction that our
foreign policy had been perfectly loyal and clear, perfectly cor-
rect. (Hear, hear.)

Few countries can have defined their objectives so clearly;
confined themselves to promises they could be sure of keeping ;
enlightened their neighbours as to their intentions. There was
not — there is not — any change, any element of surprise. What-
ever happens, nobody can say Belgium deceived them. (Fur-
ther marks of approval.)

On April 29th, 1937, I said in the Chamber:

“ What are the principles on which our foreign policy is based?

“ I should like to remind you of them once again. We want first
and foremost to find a formula for uniting our people. We do
not want to make sacrifices for the sake of a specifically Walloon
or specifically Flemish ideology. We want a policy that is solely
and exclusively Belgian. We want a policy firmly rooted in our
national traditions, a policy which will help us to play our part in
Europe.

“ Belgium has no direct interests outside her own frontiers ; she
has no ambition other than to remain what she is; she seeks
nothing ; she asks nothing of anyone but peace.

“ But — and this is both her misfortune and her greatness — she
has for centuries been a European batttlefield, a highway for

APPENDIX 14 93

invasion for all the conquerors. Her role, the role entrusted to her,
one she must fulfil, is to close up on all sides and in all directions
the way of invasion ; to erect so many barriers and create so many
difficulties on the battlefield of Europe that even the boldest are
deterred.

“ That is why our military policy is so closely bound up with our
foreign policy. If Europe has more confidence in us to-day, it is
not only because of our loyal attitude. It is because a few months
ago, for the first time in our history, we all together shouldered
the heavy burdens demanded of us.”

Two years later, on June 8th, 1939, M. Pierlot in his turn
summarized our chief aspirations :

“ The main object of our policy of independence, in so far as it
rests with us, is to preserve our country from the scourge of war.
Belgium is a resolutely pacific country. She is determined not to
take up arms except against an aggression directly aimed at her
vital interests. In other words, the only ground for war that we
would accept is national defence. But in such a case, we are
ready to make every sacrifice, because more important than peace
are liberty and honour.” (Loud cheers.)

These few sentences of which you have just signified your
approval, these principles which you have ratified by your votes,
still hold good to-day.

In 1935 the Treaty of Locarno was torn up and the last illusion
about the League of Nations was shattered. We were faced
with this dilemma: an alliance with the Great Powers or inde-
pendence.

We did not want an alliance, whatever our sympathy with our
possible partners, for it would have made of us mediocre fol-
lowers, it would have involved us in an international policy that
we were not strong enough to apply; it would have led us
irresistibly to war.

We wanted to remain ourselves, to remain, as far as possible,
masters of our fate. We wanted in so doing to play the part which
geography and history have assigned to us in Western Europe.
We dreamed of being a crossroads where all the great currents of
civilization might peacefully cross one another. We have told
everybody what we should like to be, what we want to do. It is
a good thing, it is useful, to recall to-day that France, Great
Britain, and Germany solemnly proclaimed that this policy was
justified.

Our neighbours who, at the beginning of the present conflict,
solemnly confirmed their determination to respect our territory,
have themselves summed up in terms we cannot but accept
certain principles underlying our policy.

94 APPENDIX 14

They have taken note of our determination expressed publicly
and on more than one occasion to defend the frontiers of Belgium
with all our forces against any aggression or invasion, and to
prevent Belgium from being used, for purposes of aggression
against another State, as a passage or as a base of operations by
land, by sea, or in the air.

Though we have concluded no treaty, in the actual meaning
of the word, with France, Great Britain, or Germany, we have
entered into a moral undertaking to which we intend to adhere,
so long as the situation in Western Europe remains what it is to-
day.

International law, international morality, have sustained violent
blows in recent times. In spite of all, they remain a refuge for
small nations, and, whatever the transgressions of others, Belgium
would never be justified in breaking her word.

We shall never give up our chief claim to consideration — our
loyalty.

The discreet policy we have adopted is justified by our general
desire to avoid war, but also by our more definite desire to avoid
becoming once more the battlefield of Europe.

Those in other countries who judge us severely or give us
advice, those at home — happily they become fewer every day —
who disapprove of the Government’s policy, have not under-
stood what will happen to us if this policy fails.

As early as October 14th, 1936, the King said : “ In the absence
of a defence system of her own, capable of withstanding the
invader, the invasion would penetrate deeply into Belgium at the
very beginning and she would be devastated at once. Afterwards
friendly intervention might, of course, ensure final victory, but in
the process the country would suffer ravages such as would be
infinitely worse than those of the war of 1914—18.”

No country wants war ; no country would agree to be a field of
battle.

The Scandinavian countries showed this during the Finnish
war. The Balkan countries are wise and sensible, and do not
risk lighting a fire that would, they realize, assume devastating
proportions.

The great belligerent countries themselves have taken their
precautions.

France has her Maginot line; Germany has her Siegfried line;
Great Britain has the sea.

Behind this triple belt, they can face the idea of war because they
feel safe. Belgium could not build ramparts on her threatened
frontiers : it would have been out of proportion to her resources.
She did what she could in the military sphere, and she is happy

APPENDIX 14

95

to have done so, but she sought rather to complement her security

in the diplomatic field. . .

I do not want to paint a picture of the horrors our country
might have to endure if it were involved in war— it would be only
too easy to do so. But I venture to say that our fate would be
worse than that of any other belligerent. This alone is sufficient
justification for our efforts, and I am not ashamed of egoism, the
sacred egoism which inspires me when I am fighting to spare
Belgium an ordeal she has not deserved. (Loud applause.)

All these ideas, all these principles, were ours before the war.
We have been guided by them for the past eight months, and we

still believe in them. . „ ...... ...

I am glad to say we have not had a single incident with the

belligerents that has led to a really serious situation.

Twice only— at Nivelles at the begmmng of the war and, more
tragically, at St. Hubert a few weeks ago— we have had to deplore
some injured and one dead. Each time our rights were fully
recognized ; each time we were compensated for the damage done.

In a very difficult situation, placed as we are between great
neighbours engaged in a formidable struggle, we stood firm
without flinching. There was, I swear, no provocation, no boast-
ing ' nor was there any lack of firmness and dignity.

What helps us, what has saved us so far — I shall never weary of
repeating— is our loyalty. Here, as in the econonuc and military
spheres, 8 we have done everything we could and everything we

S ^Wef have brought the country’s fighting strength up to 'the
highest pitch, and we have never lost sight of the fact that at
present we must depend first and foremost on ourselves.

The public is anxious, and I can quite understand that. th^ r
anxiety makes them too ready to listen to certain rumorns We
must, by displaying calm, help them to overcome this tendency-
Bel mans can be sure that the Government will not accept any
suggestion calculated to change our policy, a pohcy approved by
the vast majority of the people. .

We have a very difficult task ahead of us; our responsibilities
are very heavy. The whole future of Belgium is at stake. We are
therefore entitled to ask for your confidence and your help.

We are also entitled to ask you to show that national discipline
which is so necessary to-day. We in the Government have
sympathies and friendships too, but far above
Love of friendship is very precious, and we all would wffimgly
give ourselves up to it. The path of duty is rougher, yet we

m Above all, we must protect our people; we must spare them

APPENDIX 16

97

96 APPENDIX 14

war ; we must save our children ; we must safeguard our towns and
our countryside.

Our duty as leaders — our duty as men — is above all to preserve
peace.

It is also our duty, should our independence or our vital
interests be threatened, to be strong enough effectively to defend
them.

The country desires peace; the country desires neutrality.
The country will do its duty all the better if it is compelled to do
so, if it has the deep conviction, the absolute assurance, that its
leaders have done their utmost to preserve peace and neutrality.
That is our duty — our difficult but splendid duty.

If you are only willing to help us, we shall succeed. (Loud
applause, except from the Communists.)

Appendix 15

NOTE BY THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE,
DATED MARCH 28TH, 1940, ON THE DEFENSIVE
WORKS CARRIED OUT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF
THE CONFLICT

A formidable steel barrier divides the interior of the country
and forms a practically impassable barrier to probable attacks
by armoured tanks. The wall of steel constructed by our
untrained builders is at present 70 km. long. It represents a
weight of over 30,000 tons; 34,000 tons of steel framework,
1,000 tons of steel cables, 150 tons of camouflage colouring, and
about 600 tons of various materials. Thus, 35,000 tons of steel
have been put in position in open country, across fields, woods
and marshes, floods, rivers and railways, leaving no loophole
for the assailant.

Every difficulty has been overcome — gradients, mud, water.
Neither rain nor snow nor cold have stopped the work for one
second. In temperatures as low as — 16°, when the cold was so
intense that the heavy pieces of steel stuck to the hands of the
men, they doggedly continued to raise this formidable barrier
across our fields and woods. From November 1st to December
31st, during the rainiest season, when the winter was already very
severe, our soldiers raised a steel wall 30 km. long in a sea of
mud, in water and in the cold.

Appendix 16

MEASURES TAKEN BY BELGIUM TO STRENGTHEN

The object of these measures is : . .

1. To reinforce the fortified system and to strengthen the
protective measures of the country.

2. To increase the number of effectives on a war footing.

3. To modernize and augment material and armament.

I. The Belgian Fortified System and Protective Measures

The construction of the Belgian fortified system, which was
begun in 1928, was continued at an ever-increasing speed down
to May 1940. The plan for the fortified system and protective
measures was closely connected with the plan of campaign, and
the two were developed on parallel lines.

In the Province of Liege

The rearming and modernization of eight old forts at Liege
(the six forts on the right bank and the forts of Flemalle and
Pontisse on the left bank) was begun in 1928.

To meet the danger of a sudden attack, designed to hamper
the mobilization of the Belgian Army, a chain of pillboxes against
invasion was established on the line running from Jupille, Chenee,
and Renory, covering all the roads into Liege. They were
equipped with 47-mm. guns, searchlights, machine-guns, and
sub-machine guns, and were guarded by anti-tank obstacles
They were manned permanently. For the same purpose, fortified
posts covering important road junctions were constructed near
the frontier at Homburg, Henrichapelle, Dolhain, Jalhaye, and

M In m the y 'gaps between the old forts, a beginning was made in
1934 with the construction of flanking casemates for automatic

^AfteTthese measures of security had been taken, the construc-
tion was begun of a new fortified line comprising the new forts
of Eben-Emael, Neufchateau, Battice, and Pepinster, and a
number of flanking casemates for automatic weapons were
constructed in the gaps between these works.

From the frontier to the Meuse there were several lines along
which provision had been made for the destruction of roads and
bridges, the efficacy of which depended on fire from the new
and old forts.

98 APPENDIX 16

The fortified town was also provided with an underground
telephone system, control-rooms, a planned road system, gun-
emplacements for heavy artillery on railway-tracks, stores of
ammunition and materials. To guard, maintain, and man all
these fortifications and to carry out demolition work it was
necessary to form special units on a voluntary basis. These
consisted of battalions of cyclist frontier guards.

In the Provinces of Limburg and Antwerp

The defences had necessarily to follow the water-lines. De-
fensive structures were established, in the first place, along the
canal from Maastricht to Bois-le-Duc and the canal joining the
Meuse and the Escaut. They consisted of :

Casemates for automatic weapons enfilading the water-level
and pillboxes covering the bridges ;

Arrangements for flooding and demolition work.

As the Albert Canal was cut, similar works were constructed.
They were finished in 1939.

The Limburg structures, when completed, were linked up with
the fortified town of Li£ge by the Eben-Emael fort.

In the Provinces of Namur and Luxemburg

The defence system was based on the fortified town of Namur,
which was rearmed and modernized on the same lines as the
fortified town of Liege (ring of old forts ; pillboxes in the gaps,
line of pillboxes against invasion, fortified posts on the frontier,
progressive lines of demolition). In order to take advantage of
the broken Ardennes country, a division of “Chasseurs Ardennais,”
specially trained in skirmishing, was formed. Tactics of this
kind, which would be facilitated by the valleys and by demolition
work, were calculated to inflict heavy losses on an invader and
to cause considerable delay.

From 1936 onward , the Government was obliged, because of
the repudiation by Germany of the military clauses of the Treaty
of Versailles and the Treaty of Locarno, to strengthen the
national defence system still further. Its aim was to build up a
military machine sufficiently strong to discourage Belgium’s
neighbours from attempting to use Belgium as a battlefield or
as a base for an attack. From the military standpoint, the risks
involved by the changed situation in Europe had two conse-
quences :

1. It became necessary to strengthen the protective measures.

The period of military service was extended to a year, and a
considerable part of the contingent in the 1937-41 classes was
required to do seventeen months’ service.

appendix 16 99

2. It became necessary to modify the fortified system.

The concrete and iron framework established on the frontier
on the Antwerp-Liege-Namur line could no longer be used as
the backbone for a position of resistance. The Belgian Army
could not hold a front over 200 km. long.

In 1939, the construction of a fortified position on the Antwerp-
Namur line was begun. This position, known as K.W. from
the names of the terminal points (Koningshoyckt and Wavre),
consisted of a number of works disposed on several lines. They
were protected in front by a continuous anti-tank barricade and
by flooding, whilst anti-tank traps were set deep in the position.
An underground telephone system and a planned road system
completed the equipment of the position. These works were
completed in May 1940.

II. Increase in the Number of Effectives on a War Footing

In 1930 the Belgian Army had one cavalry corps consisting of
two divisions and three army corps each consisting of two
divisions of infantry on a war footing. It was obvious that its
military machine was inadequate. Six reserve divisions (with
the same composition as the divisions on active service) were
therefore put into working order. In 1936 it was decided to
organize six divisions of the second reserve. For protective
purposes, a division of “ Chasseurs Ardennais ” was formed.

In August 1939, the Belgian Army had on a war footing:

1 cavalry corps consisting of 2 cavalry divisions and a brigade
of motorized cavalry ;

5 army corps and 2 reserve army corps, consisting in all of :

12 divisions on active service and in the reserve;

2 divisions of “ Chasseurs Ardennais ” ;

6 divisions of the second reserve ;

1 brigade of cyclist frontier guards.

On May 10th, 1940, the Belgian Army consisted of 650,000
regulars.

It was the strongest Army Belgium had ever had. The order
for general mobilization brought the strength up to over 900,000
men, representing more than one-tenth of the population — that
is to say, the maximum military effort of which a country is
capable.

III. Modernization and Augmentation of Arms

A small, peaceful country must organize, train, and equip its
Army for the defensive.

Acting on this principle, the Belgian General Staff rejected

100

101

APPENDIX 16

a priori the idea of forming a military air force and armoured
units and devoted the maximum credits to acquiring defensive
weapons.

The infantry was well-equipped with a very valuable anti-tank
arm: the 47-mm. gun (sixty 47-mm. guns to each infantry
division). It was provided with new bomb-throwers; its sub-
machine-guns were renewed, the rifles being brought up to date,
and the number of 75-mm. mortars was trebled.

The artillery was expanded. Provision was made for increasing
the number of groups in the infantry divisions from four to five
and those in the Army Corps from four to six. As an experiment,
part of the artillery of the Army Corps was motorized. A new
Land Anti-Aircraft Defence Gun (40-mm. Bofors gun) was put
into service.

The light troops were completely motorized. Their mobility
and radius of action were thus very considerably enlarged.

Lastly, having regard to the primary importance of communi-
cations in modern warfare, the Belgian Army was equipped with
a considerable amount of first-rate telephone and wireless
material.

That, in broad outline, is a description of the military burden
which Belgium took upon herself. No sacrifice in either men
or money was spared. The number of army effectives on a war
footing was over 10 per cent, of the population, a figure which
was not reached by the belligerent nations during the 1914-18
War. The expenditure incurred in setting up a military machine
of this magnitude and in constructing our fortified system
increased year by year, and in 1939 it amounted to 20 per cent,
of the total budget.

Appendix 17

TEXT OF THE PROTEST COMMUNICATED BY THE
BELGIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE FOREIGN GOVERN-
MENTS FOLLOWING UPON THE GERMAN AGGRES-
SION OF MAY 10TH, 1940

Although Germany has not declared war, the German Army
has just crossed the frontier of the Kingdom of Belgium and has
attacked the Belgian Army with considerable forces. All the
facts and all the documents in the possession of the Belgian
Government prove that the aggression was premeditated. No
complaint was brought to its notice before the act of aggression.
Moreover, there was nothing in the relations between the two
countries, for the most part good, to suggest that a conflict was

APPENDIX 17

likely to arise. The Belgian Government protests against this
outrage. It points out that for the second time in twenty-five
years Belgium has been the victim of an aggression by Germany.
In its declaration of October 13th, 1937, the German Govern-
ment solemnly confirmed its determination in no circumstances
to impair the inviolability and integrity of Belgium and stated
that “ it will at all times respect Belgian territory, except, of
course, in the event of Belgium’s taking part in a military action
directed against Germany in an armed conflict in which Germany
is involved,” declaring that it was prepared to assist Belgium
should she be subjected to an attack or to invasion. On August
26th, in a spontaneous declaration, the German Government
solemnly renewed its undertaking of October 13th, 1937. Since
making the Declaration in 1937, Germany has on many occasions
paid tribute to the correctness of the attitude maintained by
Belgium. Public opinion is unanimous in recognizing that the
Belgian Government has done everything in its power to avert
the scourge of war which threatened Europe. On the eve of the
European War, the Kin g of the Belgians, in conjunction with the
Heads of other States, and more particularly with Her Majesty
the Queen of the Netherlands, took steps to avert the danger.
It is sufficient to recall the appeal made from Brussels on August
23rd, 1939, on behalf of the Heads of the States of the Oslo
Group and the offer of good offices on the 29th of the same
month. A further offer of good offices was made on November
7th by the Queen of the Netherlands and the King of the Belgians,
with a view to facilitating enquiry into points on which agreement
could be reached. During the conflict, Belgium has always
observed strict and scrupulous neutrality. She was attacked
suddenly at dawn. The aggression was consummated when the
Government appealed to the guarantor Powers. Just as in
August 1914, Germany violated Belgian neutrality which she had
guaranteed in virtue of the treaties of April 19th, 1839, so to-day
she has attacked Belgium in contravention of an undertaking
contracted in 1937 and renewed in 1939, the validity of which is
not open to question. As in 1914, an act of aggression against a
neutral State, while not justified in itself, is made worse by the
violation of undertakings that had been entered into. This new
outrage will deeply shock the conscience of the world. The
German Reich will be held responsible by history for the suffer-
ings which this act of aggression will inflict on the Belgian people.
Belgium has never accepted servitude. She will suffer her ordeal
courageously. The Belgian Army will defend Belgian national
territory with all its force, with the help of Belgium’s guarantors,
who will not fail to fulfil their promises.

TxP

102 APPENDIX 18

Appendix 18

PROCLAMATION BY KING LEOPOLD, MAY 10TH, 1940

Belgians, for the second time in a quarter of a century, Belgium
—a loyal and neutral country— has been attacked by the German
Empire in spite of the most solemn undertakings contracted before
the "whole world. The Belgian people, who are fundamentally
peaceful, have done everything in their power to prevent this, but
between sacrifice and dishonour the Belgian of 1940 will hesitate
no more than did the Belgian of 1914.

By awaiting the actual violation of our territory before appeal-
ing to our two guarantors, who have remained faithful to their
promises, we have most loyally fulfilled to the last the duties of
neutrality.

To our valiant Army, to our courageous soldiers, I address the
greetings of the country. In them we place complete confidence.
Worthy successors of the heroes of 1914, they will fight shoulder
to shoulder to stop the onrush of the enemy through our provinces
and to restrict the area of our national territory which is violated
by the invader.

Thanks to the efforts which our country agreed to make, our
fighting forces are infinitely more powerful than they were in
1914.

France and Great Britain have promised to help us. Their
advance troops are already pushing forward to join up with ours.
The fight will be hard. Great sacrifices and deprivation will be
asked of you. But there can be no doubt about the final victory. I
intend to remain faithful to my constitutional oath to maintain
the independence and integrity of the territory. Like my father
in 1914, 1 have put myself at the head of the Army with the same
faith, the same clear conscience. The cause of Belgium is pure.
With the help of God it will triumph.

Appendix 19

TRANSLATION OF TEXT BELOW MAP
Comrades !

Here is the situation !

In any case, the war is over for you !

Your "leaders are going to escape by airplane.

Lay down your arms !

Camarades!

Telle est la situation!

En tout cas, la guerre est finie pour vousl
Vos chefs vont s’enfuir par avion.

A bas les armes!

British Soldiers 1

Look at this map; it gives your true situation I
Your troops are entirely surrounded —
stop fighting!

Put down your arms!

Copy of German Leaflets dropped in the Belgian Lines

8

103

104

APPENDIX 20

Appendix 20

KING LEOPOLD’S ORDER OF THE DAY, MAY 25TH, 1940
Translation of Text in Flemish and French
Soldiers :

The great battle which we were expecting has commenced.

It will be hard. We will carry it on with all our strength and
with supreme energy.

It is being fought on the ground where in 1914 we stood
victoriously against the invader.

Soldiers :

Belgium expects that you will do honour to her Flag.

Officers and Men:

Whatever happens, my fate will be yours.

I ask of you all firmness, discipline, trust.

Our cause is just and pure.

Providence will help us.

Long Live Belgium !

In the field, the 25th of May , 1940.

Leopold.

Appendix 21

STATEMENT BY LIEUT.-COL. ROBERT DUNCAN
BROWN, UNITED STATES MILITARY ATTACHE TO
BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG

The German Armies in May 1940, supported by immense Air
Power, drove west into Holland, Belgium, and France, quickly
conquered Holland and broke the hinge of Allied Defence at
Sedan. The Sedan break-through compelled the retreat of all
Northern Allied forces and separated the British and Belgian
Forces from the French Main Forces. A French counter-attack
against the German spear-head aimed at Abbeville might have
re-established the situation but this counter-attack never
developed.

The Belgian Army fought doggedly on successive retreat
positions and at last found themselves completely cut off with
their backs to the sea. Their artillery had fought with extreme

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106 APPENDIX 21

brilliancy, their large units were well led. However, they were
cut off and they had virtually no air power or anti-aircraft
artillery protection against German air might.

The Belgian King’s capitulation on May 28th was the only
thing that King Leopold could do. Those who say otherwise
didn’t see the fighting and they didn’t see the German Air Force.
I saw both.

Robert Duncan Brown.

October 31 st, 1940.

Appendix 22

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
June 13 th f 1941

King’s Bench Division

Sir Roger Keyes v. Daily Mirror Newspapers Limited
Before Mr. Justice Tucker

Sir Patrick Hastings, K.C., and Mr. Valentine Holmes appear
for Sir Roger Keyes ; Mr. G. O. Slade for the defendants.

Statement made by Sir Patrick Hastings :

This is an action for libel brought by Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Roger Keyes against the Daily Mirror Newspapers Limited
in consequence of an article which appeared in the Daily Mirror
newspaper of May 30th, 1940.

The Germans invaded Belgium on May 10th, and a few
hours later Sir Roger Keyes, at the request of our Government,
left England by aeroplane to join King Leopold as special liaison
officer. He was with the King at the Headquarters of his Army
throughout the brief campaign in Belgium, and at the same time
was in close touch with the Headquarters of the British Army
and with the Government. He remained with King Leopold
until 10 p.m. on the night of May 27th, the day on which
King Leopold asked the Germans for an armistice. During that
time he had unrivalled opportunities of observing the course
of events.

On May 28th, Mr. Churchill announced in the House of
Commons that the surrender had taken place and asked that
judgment about the matter should be suspended until the facts
were known.

Sir Roger Keyes on the same day, in the lobby, echoed the
same advice and trusted that judgment on King Leopold, a very

APPENDIX 22 107

gallant soldier, should be suspended till all the facts became
known.

This advice did not appeal to the persons responsible for the
conduct of the Daily Mirror newspaper, and on May 30th
that paper published a diatribe attacking violently not only the
King of the Belgians but also Sir Roger Keyes.

How far justified Sir Roger was in his advice to suspend
judgment is now beginning to be understood.

King Leopold, when his country was invaded, had placed
himself and his Army under the French High Command, and the
movements of his Army conformed with the orders of the French
Command.

On May 20th, the British Army and French Northern Army
were ordered to prepare to fight to the south-westward to
regain contact with the main French Army, and unless the
Belgian Army could conform to this movement it was clear that
it would involve a breach of contact between the British and
Belgian Armies.

Sir Roger informed the King of the order, and he was asked by
the King to inform the British Government and Lord Gort that
the Belgian Army had neither tanks nor aircraft and existed
solely for defence. He did not feel he had any right to expect
the British Government to jeopardize, perhaps, the very existence
of the British Army in order to keep contact with the Belgian
Army, but he wished to make it quite clear that if there were
a separation between the two Armies, the capitulation of the
Belgian Army would be inevitable.

At the request of the French High Command the Belgian
Army was withdrawn on May 23rd from the strongly prepared
position on the Scheldt to a much weaker and longer line on the
Lys, to allow the British Army to retire behind the defensive
frontier line which it had occupied throughout the winter, in
order to prepare for the offensive it was about to undertake to
the southward.

On the evening of May 26th, a break through the Belgian
fine by the Germans seemed to be inevitable and the King moved
the remaining French 60th Division in Belgian vehicles to a
prepared position across the Yser, which by now was flooded
over a wide area and its bridges mined.

Fighting on the Belgian front had been continuous for four
days, and the Belgian Army, by May 27th, was running short
of food and ammunition and was being attacked by at least
eight German divisions, including armoured units and wave after
wave of dive bombers.

On the morning of May 27th, the King asked Sir Roger to

108

109

APPENDIX 22

inform the British authorities that he would be obliged to
surrender before a debacle took place. A similar message was
given to the French.

By the afternoon of that day the German Army had driven
a wedge between the Belgian and British Armies. Every road,
village, and town in the small part of Belgium left in Belgian
hands was thronged with hundreds of thousands of refugees, and
men, women, and children were being mercilessly bombed and
machine-gunned by low-flying aircraft.

In these circumstances, at 5 p.m. on the 27th, King Leopold
informed the British and French authorities that he intended at
midnight of that day to ask for an armistice so as to avoid
further slaughter of his people.

This message, like the earlier one on the same day, was
promptly received in London and Paris, but all communications
with the British Army were cut, and though wireless messages
were repeatedly made, it is now known that these did not reach
the Commanders-in- Chief.

Sir Roger Keyes, knowing these facts as he did, with a number
of details that are unnecessary for the purposes of this statement,
felt more than justified in suggesting a suspension of judgment on
the King, and he quite naturally resented the insult and injury of
the article in the Daily Mirror attacking him. He immediately
saw his solicitors and the present action was started.

The defence to the action pleaded that the words of the libel,
so far as they were statements of fact were true in substance and
in fact, and so far as they were expressions of opinion that they
were fair comment.

Wiser counsel subsequently prevailed, and this defence was
withdrawn by a letter from the Defendants’ Solicitors in the
following words :

Dear Sirs,

Temple Chambers,

Temple Avenue, E.C.4.
October 9th , 1940.

Keyes v. Daily Mirror

Our Clients have been advised by Counsel that as a matter
of law their defence of fair comment in this action cannot succeed
unless they can substantiate the statements of fact in the article
complained of with reference to the conduct of King Leopold.

Our Clients are not in a position to prove these statements
to be true and we should accordingly be glad if you would treat
this letter as a formal notice that their plea of fair comment will
no longer be relied upon.

APPENDIX 22

Whether the strictures passed upon King Leopold by,
amongst others, the Prime Minister of France, were in fact
justified, our Clients have no means of knowing; all they can say
is that if there was the slightest doubt about the matter, nothing
could have been more dignified and proper than your Client’s
request for a suspension of judgment upon King Leopold and
nothing more creditable than that your Client should have made
the request at the time that he did, when everyone’s hand was
against the King.

As the whole criticism of your Client in the article complained
of was based upon facts which our Clients then believed and had
the highest possible authority for believing to be true, but which
they must now assume to be untrue, it follows that every vestige
of foundation for such criticism disappears, and our Clients are
accordingly desirous of making honourable amends to your
Client, who has acted throughout in accordance with the highest
traditions of honour and justice.

Our Clients invite your Client to say what he would like them
to do as an earnest of their sincerity in making this offer, since
they feel that he will not want to fasten too much responsibility
upon them for acting upon information coming from sources
which they had every right to regard as unimpeachable.

Upon this last aspect of the case our Clients will be serving
a notice in mitigation of damages if it should still be necessary
for this action to proceed to trial.

Yours faithfully,

Shirley Woolmer & Co.

Messrs. Alfred Cox & Son,

37, Norfolk Street,

Strand, W.C.2.

After this withdrawal and the acceptance and publication of
the foregoing statement, there was nothing left of the action
except the question of damages, and these have now been agreed.

The further account of the proceedings was given by The
Times of June 14th, 1941, as follows :

Mr. Slade said that his Lordship would observe from the
papers before him how unimpeachable had been the defendants’
sources of information as to the conduct ascribed to the King
of the Belgians in seeking an armistice from the Germans on
May 27th, 1940. The defendants accepted without reservation
the statement just made by Sir Patrick Hastings, from which it
would appear that they had been entirely misled. They welcomed

no

appendix 22

the opportunity of repeating in open Court the sentiments
expressed in their solicitors’ letter of October 9th, 1940.

Sir Roger Keyes’s dignified and fair-minded attitude towards
the King of the Belgians had been abundantly justified* and the
defendants tendered to the gallant Admiral a sincere apology
for their criticism of him, coupled with an expression of their

appreciation of his conduct and bearing throughout.

The matter did not, however, end there. It was apparent
from the facts stated on behalf of Sir Roger Keyes that a very
grave injustice had been done to the King of the Belgians, who,
like Sir Roger Keyes, had acted throughout m accordance with
the highest^traditions of honour and justice The defendants
accordingly wished to take advantage of the opportunity to
tender also to King Leopold, who was not now in a position to
defend himself, their most sincere and r ® s P ec f u ^ ap ?l?^ ^
injustice which they had unwittingly done him. They hoped
that if and when their apology came to the knowledge of King
Leopold he would accept it in the spirit in which it was offered.

Mr Justice Tucker, in assenting to the settlement and to the
withdrawal of the record, said that this libel action, unlike some
others appeared to have served a most useful purpose, and the
statement? which had been made would give very wide satis-

Solicitors : — Messrs. Alfred Cox & Son; Messrs. Shirley
Woolmer & Co.

Made and Printed in Great Britain by
Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ltd.
London and Aylesbury.